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AbstractH .
To inerease the availability of a po~er plant means alsoto inv~st more money
. .
in the plant. A ctiterion tö weigh the improved availability aghinst th~ in-
creased plant cost is therefore needed. Fot this reason~ the annual 10ss func-
tion of a power plant 18 introduced: the minimum of this functiön gives the
best balance between improved availability and increased plant cost. The safety
requirement i8 a constraint to the problem of findlng the ciiriimum of the func-
tion. The mathematical expressions to calculate the annual 16$s fuhction are
derived$ and a numerical example i5 also included. Some eeneral pröbab!liSt!C
considerations on reactor containers are also discussed.
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1. Introductiop
One bf the problems~ w1th which the des1gher of electric power plan~s 15 faced,
15 that cif constructing the plant in such a way that it can function,safe.JY
and econom1cally. To increase the degree cf safety of a plant 1s pai~always
by making it to function less economically. In fact the safest plan~ is tHat
which 15 always in shut down~ which meansthat it does not function at all.
During normat öperati6ti~ it cati happen that ehe plant 1 due eb the faildte öf
oue df its parts, goes to shut dO~Jn7 and does not produce electric1~y during
the time in which is being repaired. This results in a loss of money for the
company which O\vns the plant. This consideration should drive the designer to
design a better plant, in which the failure probability of its parts is reduced.
Eut to design a more reliable plant means also to invest more money in it.
From what we have said~ one can already conclude that the desipner must weigh
the improvement obtained in the plant availability against the increased plant
cost. Scope of this report is to give the criteria \Jhich allow to find this
optimum value of the plant availability, and, at the same time, to satisfy the
safety requirements given by the safety committee.
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2. Fundamental concepts. Different types of failures.
From an operational point of view, we can think that a plant consists of two
systems; the l?Functional Syste.m.l1 and the HSafety SystemlI.
The "Functional System!! 15 that part of the plant Hhich performs the function
of the plant~ that is to produce electricity. The :iFunctional System;! includes
those parts of the plant (such as reactor~ pumps~ heat exchangers~ etc.)~ which
all together allow the plant to produce electricity.
The "Safety System!! is that part of the plant tJhich protects the "Functional
Systemfl against acc1dents.
For this reason, signals coming fram the IiPunctiona1 Systemi1 are continuou8ly
detected by the "Safety Systemll (fir> 1).
If the signals indicate that a dangerous situation exists~ the Safety System
will shut the plant do"vn.
He 8ha11 call "Functional Subsystem~' any part of the functional system v7hich,
if it faUs ~ does not allm'1 the plant to perform it5 function at all ~ or at
least in a safe way. Ta illustrate this definition, we shall make two examples.
Let us take the case of a nuclear power plant. The pump of the primary coolant
circuit (fig. 13) 1s driven by an electric motor tnlich is fed from apower
supply. If the power supply fails, the pump stops~ the coolant flow decreases s
and the reactor is not cooled any more. The consequence 'HilI be that the heat
is not converted into electricity; vlhich means that the functional system does
not perform its function any more. In addition, since the reactor is not cooled~
the heat produced remains inside it and, if the plant is not shut dovm? there
ivill be a lidisasterB or a "big accident" (core melt dm-m).
The power supply i5 t3erefore a functional subsystem, because its failure does
not alloN the plant to function. Let us suppose nO~J that we have two power
supplies, one working and the other in stand-by. connected in such a way that s
if the first faUs, it i8 automatically s"litched off ~ v,]hile the second 1s
automatically switched into operation. In this case the functional subsystem
is made of both the pmJer supplies ~ and ea.ch of them will be called liunit".
The fu.l1ctional subsystem faHs 9 if both the unit5 fail.
The second example refers also to the primary coolant circuit of a nuclear
power plant. The bearings of the primary coolant pump (fig. 13) are cooled
vrith oil~ which is maintained in circulation by means of an oi1 pump. If the
oil pump fails, the functional systemcan contlhue still for some time to pro-
duce electricity~ but not in a safe way. In fact~ if the prima~J coolant pump
is not switched off, ehe bearings will jam and the pump will fail (loss of
coolaht flow aCdidene). The oil pump is also a functional subsystem and, as
for ehe ccise of the pO\-ler supply> ue can havean :loil pumps subsystem" uhich
cdrtsists of two or more oi1 pumps, that 1s of two or more units. The functional
subsystems have only one type of failure. This does not mean that they can fail
only in one way, but that their fallures have only one consequence> namely that
they bring the plant in a so dangerous situation, that plant shut do~m is required.
Let us take, for example~ a ilpouer supplies subsystem;! consistin'G of one unit
only. The modes of failure of the pO~Jer supply are many~ but the consequence 1s
only one: the motor of the primary coolant pump is not driven any moreo The units
of the functional subsystems ':7i11 be characterized by only one average failure
rate, cr~, which takes into account all the failure modes of the unit. If we
r
indicate tolith HhF(t)iI the total failure probability density distribution of the
unit, ~ve have (Appendix 1)
where
1cr =----:--:--0;----=-----:::--:-::-- =F mean time between two failures
t = time
10Ti'~ h.,.,(t)dt..'o (I)
GF = maintenance period, that 1s time interval between two
preventive replacements (or repairs) of the unit.
If no preventive maintenance 1s planned (0~=OO» eq. I becomes:
...
I
cr = -:-------
F Joo
.• t hp(t)dt
o
(2)
The average failure rate, Ap " of a functiona1 subsystem depends upon the charac-
teristics ofthe units "\Jhich form the subsystem and upon the ""my in uhich these
units are connected (strategy). The calculation of :iAT.;'ll as function of the unit
>.:
characteristics for different strategies is sho~m in paragraph 504.
The plant will be shut do~vn from time to time to carry out the maintenance of the
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big eomponents. This maintenance 1s called uroutine plant maintenance if •
The maintenance period nepi' of a unH belonging to a. functional subsystem ean
be shotter than that of the "routine plant maintenance1l 9 if the funCtional
subsystem consists at least of two units. In faet~ in the case in which the
functiona1 subsystem consists of one urlit on1Y9 in order to carry out t~e
preventive maintenance of the unit 3 it 15 necessary to shut the plant dotvo.
The safety system too can be divided in IISafety Subsystems;!. For ci bettet under-
standing~ we shall i11ustrate a particular case. Fig. 2 shows a schematie block
diagram of some safety subsystems 3 uhich protect the reaetor of a nuelear pOller
plant against accidents. In a safety system we ean distinguish three types of
subsystems and exaetly
Subsystems 811. 812, S13. They measure some parameters (such as
power, temperatures, pressures, etc.) of the funetional system 3
and, on the basis of these measurements, deeide wether or not
to shut the plant do~m.
Subsystem 814. It 1s an intermediate relays network. whieh reee1ves
the dicision taken by the previous subsystems~ and transmit 1t to
the following subsystem.
Subsystem 815. It is a structure of actuators. The aetuators are the
organs, whieh carry out the deeision received from the relays net-
~iork. In the ease of a nuc1ear reactor the actuators ~ould be the
safety rods and its assoeiated meehanisms. In the ease of a pump9
the aetuators ~Jou1d be the e1eetric suitches uhich conneet thepump
motor to the power sttrply.
Hith reference to fig. 2~ let us suppose that the pmJer suppUes subsystem (which-'
feeds the motor of the primary coolant pump) fai1s. The 10ss of voltage to the
motor ~vil1 be measured by the linst I U meaauring ehannels l-lhich are eonnected in
such a way that, if at least ilkSlllI out of the linst t a units measure the 105S of
voltage eorrectly, the d~cision to shnt the reactor dovm will be given to 514.
This means that at least IlkSI1
1i units) at:.t.he time of the 10ss of voltage accident,
must not have already failed in such a vay that they cannot deteet the aecident
any more. lJe shall call vJith failure type Ha'l that type of failure 'i/hieh makes
the unit (of a safety subsystem) unab1e to function correctly ~hen the aecident
oecurs. The subsystem 814 operates in a similar way. ~fuen 814 reeeives theshut
d •.. f SI I ( SI2 "13)' f Illr n t 4= th Ii n • t ( 1 )mVIl aec~s~on rom· or or iJ , ~_ ....SI4 __ou~ ... =-_~SJ4-__tlE:~~ re ay~__
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operate correctly~ it will ttansmit this clecision to subsystem 815. Final1y~ if
111';.815 i1 contro1 rods uill drop inside the reactor ~ no big accid~nt l-;rill take place
and the reactor will be shut dovm. If instead~ at the time of the 10ss of vo1tage
accident~
(3)
out of the "nSll ii units don 't measure the löss of 'Vo1tage cortectly ~ no decision
to shut the reactor do~m is given to subsystem S14. In this case, since tHe
primary coo1ant pump will stop, the primary coolant flow will decrease, and
this will be detected by the measuring channels of subsystem S12~ which operates
in a way similar to S11. If also subsystem 812 fails to shut the reactor down;
the reactor outlet coolant temperature will increase, and this will be detected
by the measuring channels of subsystem S13 ~ which op'erates in a Ttlay similar to
511 and S12. If also subsystem S13 fails to shut the reactor doTtm~ there will
be a big accident (core me1t down).
The big accident (or "disasteril ) will take place also in the cases in ~'1h1ch
subsystems S14 and 815 fail to operate correctly, ~;rhen they are requiredto shut
the reactor do~m.
It can also happen that "kSll VI out of the i1n~)J 1n units detect the loss of 'Vo1tage
to the pump motor, when no loss of voltage exists (failure type b). In this case
the reactor would be erroneously ahut do~m (false trip).
Fron tIhat we have said above, we can conc1ude that the units of a safety sub-
system can have two types of failures~ failure type "aH and fai1ure type "bu •
Failure type lia" is that type of failure ~ '::lhich makes the unit unable to operate
when it is asked to operate.
Failure type "bu is that type of failure~ t'1hich makes the unit to operate, vlhen
it is not asked to operate.
For a relay mounted in such a way, that its contacts are asked to open when
there is a danger , the failure type liaH would occur if the relay becomes unable
to open lts contacts when it is asked to do it. The failure type "bn lj110uld in-
stead take place, if the relay contacts open without belng asked to open.
The units of the safety subsystems will be therefore characterized by two average
failure rates one~ PS' re1ated to failure type ~\~;1 andthe other ~ oS' to· failure
type "bn •
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In order to find out that a urtit of a safety subsystem 16 failed l-7ith failure
type "a", it is necessary \:0 test :i.t from time to time. Let us indicate 1;vith
"1"S" the cJ:1ecking period (that is the time interval between tt'10 tests), Hith
h~(t) the failure type l~a" probability density distribution of the unit and
,:;
\Vieh h~(t} the failure type ab n probability density distribution of the unit •
...,
He have (Appendix 2)
(4)
and
(5)
lJhere
Os = maintenance period~ that is time interval between two preventive
replacements (or repairs).
ö' = const.S
Off = const.S
h(t)= total failure probability density distribution given by eq. 5 in
Appendix 2.
Fig. 3 sholiS the qualitative behaviour of Ps and Os as functions of "OS" and ".s"·
lt is understandable that the shorter is ° and the longer i8 .S' the smaller,S
are Os and PS.
A safety subsystem is characterized by two parameters
(i) the reduction coefficient iiK~1 for failure type "all
and (U) the average failure rate n, a for failure type "b il •AC'
0
.... 10 -
tf a function~l'subsystem fails (for ex~ple the ~owet supplie$ sUbsystem)~
ehere is a cettain prÖDabii~~y that oue of the safaty subsystems whith should
coopetate t6 shut the reactor dovm (for e~ämple 514) has already failed with
failure type lIatt. !his t..rould happen if IImsn out of the 'Ins" units (belonging
to the safety subsystem) have failed 'tvith failure type "all. If lI A.,/ 1s the
failure rate of the functional subsystem~ the rate of occurrence nun of the
event~ that, the safety subsystem fails before the functional subsystem does~
1s given by (Appendix 3)
(6)
tvhere
(7)
and
p~ =un1t average failure rate for failuretype "a lf given by eq. 4
i::>
ns = number of the units belonging to the safety subsystem
mS =number of the units which must fail in order to make the
safety subsystem to faH (failure type na'l)
~ = checking period.S
Figs. 4, 5 and 6 show the reduction coefficient
for different values of lin li and umc:/'.S ...,
as function of "p Tn55
If ..."e now ask for the rate of occurrence "uli ~ of the event that t'tl0 safety
subsystems (i and j) fail before the functional subsystem fail~ we have
(Appendix 3)
(8)
vlhere
T( = reduction coefficient of the safety subsysten lli lV
"'Si
KSj = reduction coefficient of the safety subsystem
1lj fI
llSi;Sj = coupling coefficient
~ 11 -
HSi;Sj 1s given by
(9)
(10)
(11)
1 +
H
-SI; 52; ••• ; SN
For the ease of "Nn safet;y subsystems 'Je have
U = AF [i~1 KSi'1 RS1 ;S2 ••• SN
N
rr (mst+1)i=1
=~""-~---N
i: mS '1=1 c ~
vIhere
The failure rate "AS
il for failure type lib" of a safety subsystem 1s given by
(Appendix 4)
(12)
w'here
Os = unit average failure rate for failure type 'Ibn given by eq. 5
Q,s = number of units tIhien must faU (failure type iib n ) in order to
make the safety subsystem to fail.
~s = average repair rate of a unit, equal to the reciprocal of the
mean time needed to repair the unit. (defined by eqo 13)
(13)
(14)
where gs(t) 15 the repair probability density distribution of a unit.
Since ~S/oS is usually extremely lar8e~ eq. 12 can be l~itten as follows
2~
u
U s ! CiSA
S
:e ...,..---:;.-....,.. -7--~(nS-.Q,S)! O'S-I)
~S
- lZ -
For safety subsystems like structures of measuring channels or relays networks,
~7e have ahlays
(15)
For the safety actuators subsystems, t'7e can have either eq. 15 or
(16)
In the case of the reactor actuators subsystem (S15 in fig. 2), if one control
rod alone is sufficient to reduce the reactor power to a low value, we have
Q,S15 = 1
and therefore from eq. 12
(17)
(18)
... 3-
3. A simple model. The annual loss funceion IIZ1:.
In order to understan,d the type of p;coblem \·:rhich ~",e intend to solve~ let us
start to considcr a ver! simplified model of the electric plant.
At a given time the plant c~n bc only in'one of the following states
State UOIi
. "Normal üperati.onH
State "JIl
~'Shut Dmm"
State HZII
"Disasterl!
The plant 1.8 in ilnorm,al operation" uhich means
that it i5 producing electric power.
Thc plant is in Vlahut down!!" ~:rhich means that
it is not prcdncing elcctric po~V'er, but that
it can be rcpaired end started up again.
The plant i8 in ehe "disasteri? state trhich means
that it 1s· so heavily damaged (as a consequence
of a big accident), that it cannot be repaired
any more.
Fig. 7 shows a schematic flow diagram of the varfous states of the plant.
The plant, as seen in paragraph 2, consists of the itfunctional system" and
of the Usafety system". A failure of the lifunctional system" leads to a "big
accident" ~ if the safety system does not shut the plant dmvn.
The plant goes from sta:te "0" to state nJB in the t~·JO follmrlng cases;
a) failure of the IIfunctional systemU folloued by a correct action
of the safety syste~o
b) false trip, due to a failure of the safety system. This means
that the safety system shuts the plant dOvffi while the functional
system i8 operating correctly. Be have called this type of failure
The plant goes from state HQ" to state li2ll (disaster) Hhen the functional system
fails and the safety system does not shut the plant dOvffio Re have called this
type of the failure of the safety system fatlure type l1a l1.
He introduce nOH the fc HO'VJing symbols
Qo(t) = probability that the system is in state I~OU at time "eH
Qt(t) :: probability that the system i8 in state 11t H st time ntu
Q2(t) = probability that the system 15 in state 1"2" at time Iita
Ap = failure rate of the functional ~ystem
... 14 -
KS =reduction coefficient of the safety system
W = plant repair rate, that 1s the reciprocal of the mean
time needed to repair the plant
A = rate of occurrence öf a false trip.S
The rate of occurrence lI1)d" that a big accident occurs (safety system fai1s vlith
failure type "al; before the functiona1 system fails) ",i111 be given by
(1)
The rate of occurrence 111)" ~ that the plant goes to shut dmm as a consequence
of the fai1ure of the functional system~ 1s
Since
1) = (l-K )"SF
-5is very small «10 )~ eq. 2 can be ~rritten
1) <:::: " F
(2)
(3)
Typical values for Ap • "S' Wand KS are the follo,;ing
Äp = 0.1 t l/year
A~ = 0.01 .t O.05/year
i)
W = 10 t 100/years
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
From 4 to 7 ~ ive get the expression 8 ~l7hich holds in the practical cases
( f»v
In the following analytical treatment 9 we suppose that ,,~) Ac and Ware constant.l' i:>
This means that failure and repair probability density distributions are supposed
to be exponential.
The follov7ing equations can be ';Tritten (fig. 7)
(9)
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(10)
(11 )
(12)
nev 1fidicates the time.
eniy three bf the four.equations 9~ io s 11 and 12 afe independent. For instance s
eq. 11 can be easily obtained from eqs. 9~ 10 and 12.
Thc solution of the system Of eqs. 9 ~ 10 and 12 is des<&ibed in Appendix 5.
Here '{-Je write the appto:kimate expre'sSi8n of HQ 11 unde'lf t'he condition that the
o
expression 8 is satisfied
~ _~ 'fI +
'<0 - 'fI+>" +>..F S
(13)
Eq. 13 can be W'rit ten as follotJS
Q ::0 A • R
o
where
and
"AU 1s a funct10n tJhich has the follmving characteristics
and
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
(18)
DUß to thelarge values of "'flil (eq. 6)s "An reaches Aa> in a very short period
of time.
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For "R" liJe have inst~ad
[rJt=o =
arid
Hin 1t = 0
t~
(19)
(20)
Due to the very small values of KSAF~ uR" is pra.cf:ically eqtiai to ". n for the
all plant lifetime. l.J'e have therefore that the average plant ava11ability nAi!
durine the time 1nterval iie1 1s given by
For a time interval
(22)
eq. 21 becomes
(23)
t:A" 1s called point availability and AaJ asymptotic availability. llA<>:>tl can also
be expressed as follows
A = operation time
aJ operation time + repair time (24)
It is very interesting to notice that the point availability !lA", given by eq. 15,
would be the exact solution of the. system of eqs. 9 to 12 in the particular case
KS=O, that 1s l~en we suppose that the probability of the plant to be in the
absorbing state (disaster) is equal to zero.
Appendix 6 shows that eq; 23 is valid also in the case in l~ich failure and
repair probability density distributions are not exponential. In this case ~,
AF, AS are only average values.
"1-A 11 is called "unavailabilityH and vJe shall indicate itwith the symbol nUn
co
u = l-A =
00
Ap+AS
~+AF+AS (25)
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We shall nOlV' introduce the annual 10ss function "Z".
Hhen the plant is in shut dovm~ it does not produce electricity. The expected
amount of money lost in a year because of the unavailab:f.lity of the plant is
where
P TyU
P d:i! power of t;he plant (1~t-1)
t ;;: titmitler öf hbtit-s in a Yea.t ~ during l~hich the plarit 1s
planned to oe tri 6peration (h~s)
y =price of the k~fu minus price öf the frie1 whi~h produces
a kWh.
(26)
We sha11 call the quant1ty g1ven by-eq. 26: annual unavailab11ity cost.
The v:a1ue of "y" is very difficult to estimate. It depends upon many factors
such as the possibil1ty to increase the load of other p1ants~ or to buy the
energy from another electr1city producer. The price of the k~1h, due to the
"unavaUability" of the plant occurred dur1ng the day ~ t111l be difterent from
that due to the "unavailability" occurred during the night.
The evaluation of "r" 1s by itself a big problem which exceeds the limits of
this report. We shall suppose that y has been elsel1here already evaluated.
Some money will be lost~ to repair and start the plant up after a failure 15
occurred. Ue shall 1ndicate this amount of money vrlth "a". The expected total
mnount of money lost in a year for repair and start-up will be
(27)
We sha1l call the quantity given by eq. 27: annual shut dot~ cost.
t'Je 5ha11 indicate 'tdth "e" the annual subsystems cost a that i5 the cost per
year of allthose parts of the plant l'1hich contribute to its ilunavailabilityll.
'1'h:1s cost will include the capital costs per year for design~ construction
and installation~ the operation costs, and the maintenance costs.
l-le can nou calcu1ate the expected amount of money lost in a year "z" (annual
loss function). Taking into account eqs. 26 and 27~ and the definition of "e",
we can write
(28)
- 18 ...
From eqs. 25 and 28 we get finally
Z .("~A\r + ß.l. (Ap+AS) + e (29)
\ F S )
We rlotiee that the first term (on the right side of eq. 29) 15 a funetion whieh
increases 't.rith HAF+ASli. The term "eil will instead decrease 'tvith liAp+ AS" ~ for
the simple reason that the less the parts of the plant will fail~ the more
they "lill cost.
The function IfZIi~ being the sum of tHO terms? one increasing and the other
decreasing tvith ;'A +A ii vlill have a minimum. He saaU indieate v7ithF S?
and
respectlvely the values of Ap and AS l'1hich give the minimum value of nZ" (Zmin)'
The prolnem~ iJhieh the designer must solve? 1s to find (An) . t~ (AS> t and,; op op
Z .• Let us suppose that we have already found these values.
m~n
VIe can not-if define a second problem. The safety committee requ1res that ~ for
safety reäsons~ the rate of oeeurrenee of a big aee1dent (KSAp ) should not
exceed a value Itu 11 lV'hieh is fixed by the safety regulations. He ean V1rite
max
therefore
(30)
(31)
a way~ that its reduetion eoeffieient
by the expression 31. In effect~ the
The safety system must be designed in such
"Ies" does not exceed the limit value given
fullfillment of 31 will have a feedback to the evaluation of Z • beeause "A Ifm~n S
depends too on theeharaeteristies of the safety system. Condition31 must
therefore be regarded as a eonstraint to the problem to minimize "Zu. This will
become clearer with the numerical example uhien will be shovffi in the following
paragraph.
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4. A numerical example
We shall suppose that all the functional subsystems are 100 % reliable with
the exception öf the potver supply subsystems uhich feeds the motor of the pump
, . . . jin the primary coolant circuit of a nuclear reactör plant.
He shall also suppose that only the m~asuring channeis 6f::the voltage to the
pump motor ~äIl faÜ ~ 'tvhUe the other safety subsystems cannot fail.
If the pC31:-tel' stipply subsystem faUs 3 the pump stops. and the reactbr is hot
cooled any mbre6 1f 3 in adaition s the $afety subs,st~k fails td sbut the reac-
tor dmm HaUure tYpe Ila") ~ thete vd.d be a big ai:tc:td~nt (cora melt dötm).
The plant can go from state "0" (fig. 1) to state i*jti tn tlfe t~o foll~'t4ing cases
,
(i) failure of the power supply subsystem followed bj a d9rfec~
action of the voltage measuring channels
(ii) failure type ;lb" (false tl'ip) of the voltage measuring channels.
He shall suppose that the mean time "t/'Y" and the shut dOvffi cost "ß" to repair
the plant will be the same for both the cases.
The annual 1055 function "Zt! uill be
(I)
where
AF = failure rate of the power supp1y subsystem.
As = failure rate of the motor vo1tage measuring channels
(failure type "bU ).
CF = annual cost of the power supply subsystem
C~ = annual cost of the motor voltage measuring channelso
.,
Since v1e have
'Y »AF+AS
eq. can be simplified as follows
Z =~; y + ~ (AF+AS) + CF + Cs
(2)
(3)
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Eq. 3 ean still be t~ltten in a different ~ay
tiJhere
r nJ ~ZF T y + + CF= '±'
and
(4)
(5)
Zs =r;Y + ßJ AS + eS (6)
Let us suppose that the eonstraint given by the safety eommittee is
-9
ud = KSA17 < U = JO /year:. max (7)
The "po~Ter supp.ly subsystem" eonsists of \in 11 units one of whieh 1s t10rking andF ;;
the others are in stand-by. tllien the working unit fails~ it is automatieally
switehed off~ while one of the stand-by units is switehed into operation. The
power supply subsystem 'will fail if all the "np
ll units fail before the repair
of the first has been eompleted. Ne shall suppose in our example that the
automatie switeh eannot fail. De have (eq. 20 of para 5.4 and Appendix 7
para A7.2)
n
G F
F
tlhere
GF = average failure rate of apower supply unit
~F = average repair rate of apower supply unit
He have also
CF = n ....cpR! -t
'I'!7here
e = annual cost of apower supply unitF
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
Let us suppose that only three types of power supplies are available on the
market and that they lie on the following eurve (fig. 8)
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Fig. 9 shows "ZF" as function of "O'F" for different values of I nF".
Tc calculate the curves of fig. 9 we have used the fol1owing ntimetical
values for the known parameters
. 2
l1F = 10 /years
The "Safety subsystem" (measuring channels) consists of uns" units all
in active redundancy. The network is built in such a way that, if the
voltage to the stator fails, and II mS" out of the "nS" units also fail
(failure type "a"), the safety system will not shut the reactor down and
there will be a big accident (reactor melt down).
For the "safety subsystemll we have the following expressions (para. 2
eqs. 7, 13)
= (ms+l)!(ns-m
s
)!
~S
O's
Since we have (eq. 14 of para. 2)
eq. 17 becomes
(16)
(18)
(ns)l
= (ms-l)I
The symbols of eqs. 16 to 19 have the following meaning
Ps = unit failure rate for failure type " a ll
TS = checking period
crs = unit failure rate for failure type "b ll
J.1 S = unit repair rate, that is reciprocal of the mean time to
repair a unit after a failure type "b"
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~s = number of units which must fail in order to make the
subsystem to fail (failure type "b1i )
The cost "C " of the safety subsystem is given byS
where
Cs = annual cost of a unit
Taking into account eq. 16, the constraint 7 becomes
(21)
For the sake of simplicity, we shall suppose that only one type of measuring
channel is available on the market and that "TS" has already been chosen.
For the designer therefore, the following values will be fixed
(Js = l/year
Fig. 10 shows the limit curve
(24)
K
max
(26)
as function of "A.F".
The following two tables give "A. Sll (eq. 19); zs (eq. 6) and Ks (eq. 16)
as functions of "mS" and "nS"
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Table 1
ms = 2
n S A. S Zs KS
(years-1 ) (D.M./year)
..
3 6.10-
4 1.5'103
";;6
10
4 204-10-7 4 0102 2-10-6
5 1.2010-10 5_102 3033-10-
6
6 7.2010-14 6-102 I 5
010-6
Table 2
mS = 1
;,
n S A. S Zs KS
(year-1) (DoMo/year)
2 10-4 2 0102 10-3
3 6 010-8 , 3.102 1.5 010-3
4 2.4-10-11 4 0102 2.10-3
5 1.2-10-
14 5.102 2.5.10-3
From the analysis of figs. , and 10 and of the tables 1 and 2, we can
easily conclude that the designer will obtain the minimal annual 10ss
IIZ • 11 and at the same time will satisfy the constraint given by the
mJ.n '
safety committee, if he will take the following decisions:
Ci) he chooses, among all the types of power supply units
available on the market, the type No. 2 which is
,
characterized by
C5F = O_l/years
and
(28)
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(ii) he decides to have one power supply unit work!rtg and the other
in stand-bY3 that 15
n.,., = 2
l!
(29)
(iii) he decides to ha"e 4 measuring channels so connected that 113"
of them must fan (failure type ~Ibll) in order to sive a false
trip.
~ith the numerical values 27 9 28~ 29 3 30 and 31 3 we get
AF = lo-4/year
z,.., = 22·000 D.~1. /year
~
Zg = 400 D.E. /year
and
-10 -9KSAp = 2·10 /year < 10 /year
It is very interesting to notice from eqs. 33 and 34 that
Z «'7
S '"F
(30)
(31)
(32)
(33)
(34)
(35)
(36)
(37)
which means that the minimum of the partial annual loss IIZC!lI of a safety sub-
\)
system 1s much smaller than that of the partial annual 1055 "Zr ti of a functional
subsystem.
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5. The annual loss HZll as function of the eharaeteristies of the units of the
plant
5.1 Generals
The <h"1.nual 10ss funetion IlZ11 is given by the sum of three terms
Z = PTyU + TI + C (l)
iiPTyUIl is the iiannua1 unavailability COSt'i 3 and represents the expeeted
amount of I1lol1ey lost eaeh year, beeause of the unavailability of
the plant.
"BO i8 the 'ianl1ua1 shut d01;ffi eost'i) and represents the expeeted amount
of money needed eaeh year to repair the plant any time shut dOtffi
oceurs and to brine it baek into normal operation.
lle" is the llannual subsystems· cose', alld represents the total cost per
year of a11 the subsystems uhie!:!. eontribute to tlle plant unavaila-
bility. This eost ineludes the eapital, operation and maintenanee
costs per year of the subsystems.
In the next paragraphs ue s:1al1 express HZn aa funetion of the eharacteristies
of the units of the plant.
5.2 ,!,he Hplant unavailability", U~ as function of the eharaeteristies of the
functional and safety subsystems
In paragraph 3 we have defined three passible states of thc Dlant~ normal
operation, shut dovm, and disaster.
In reality the Hshut dO':mlf state is not only one state~ hut a collection of
different states uhicn have in commou the two followiug properties
(i) \7hen tbe ~lant is in oue of these states 9 uo eleetric power
is produced
(ii) it is possible to rerair the plant and to bring it to '~ormal
operationli.
Fig. 11 shows a sehematie flow diagra~ of the various states. Theyare
State 0 =
States 1 to 1:1 =
normal o~ere.tion
shut dmm
State D = disaster
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Each state tri jl of the "Nu shut doi4h states is charact(arized by th(a failure rate
"ui
ll
, the repa:lr rate "'1'i" aä.d th~ shut dO\m cost n,\ft j ~111ich is eh(a tost to
repair the plant and to bring it bäck iritb normal operatioh.
As seen in päragraph 3, the probabHity h QO ii that the pUht at ti.t'lie "th 1s in
state "Oll 1s given by
vlhere
h ~ AR~:o (I)
(2)
änd IIA" is the point avail.abi lity , tlhich is calculated by supposing that the
probability of the plant to be in the absorbing state (d1saster state) 1s
equal to zero.
If we neg1ect the absorbing state end ind1cate 'with l1g. I1 the probability that
1.
the plant at time IIt " is in state "iu (i=I;2 •••N), vle can write the follo'tving
equations (fig. 11 )
dA 11 N
-= - A L u. + E
'1'iSi (4)dt i=l 1. 1=1
and
N
E Si = 1 - A
i=l
(i=1 )2; •••1'1) (5)
(6)
The above "N+21l equations are not all independent~ one of thern can be obtained
from the others IlU+l ii • Since He are 1nterested in the asymptotic availability
"A
oo
", tITe can solve the equations 4 to 6 by putting all the derivatives equal
to O.
From the equations 5 we get
u.
S =..2:.Ai '.Xl 'l' • oe>
1.
where
(1.'-1--2" "")
- :v ;:. 0 0 L\l (7)
(S)
Putting the eqs. 7 in 6~ ue obtain
I-A
00
{9}
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and finally
A
00
(0)
l'Je shall D.CVl introduce the symbol "Aioo
ll so defined
\jJ
..
!.::::---U .,.\i}i ~ . i (11)
HA. ii \vould be equal tc tn8 asymptotic plant aVciilabHity "A it iri the particular
100 00
ease in uhich the state Hili is the only possi.ble shtit dCl'tm state, that 1s 't'lhen
U. :::: 0
J
and
Taking iuto aeeount eq. 11, eq. !O becomes
(12)
(13)
A
00
1 +
I~
b
i=1
i-A.
l.""
A.
:1. 00
(14)
Introdueing the "plant unavailabHityli U; we get finally from eq. 14
U.
:1.
u
. Ui=1 l~ i
N U.
1 + b .:
i=1 l-U.
l.
(15)
-~lhere U. is ealled "partial u':'''lavailability'' and it is given by
J.
-U. =
:!.
_. A.
1 00
U.
1.
=--- (16)
Eqs. 15 and 16 have been obtained for constant values of u. and ~ .• This eorres-
J. J.
ponds to the ease in ';vhich the failure proba,bility density distribution "fi (t)"
and the repair probab:i.lity de:lsity distribution "U • (t) VI are both exponential.
J.
However, due to the conclusi8TIs =eached in Appendix 6, these two equations
are also valid in the ease :b 'Hhich H.<: ' .. ') If and 1'1;ir. (t)" are not exponential.L i \.. J. '
In this last casc ?'u H ar,cl HIt." are avers.ge values given respeetively by eqs.i :\.
5 and 4 of para AE.7.
If one thinks to all the possible tombinations of failutes aci6ftg functional
-' . -
and safety subsystems~ he would conclude that thi ntlclber of shut down states
in a plant 1s tremendously high. Fö,r this reasön tt i5 convenient to divide
the shut down states ih groups ~-thicih are chdsen ~lith a criterionexplained below.
Bq. 15 can be wrltten as foltdws
N U1E _
i=J l-U.
~
(17)
Eq. 17 suggest$ ehe idea that, to get the unavailability "Uj " of a group of
"partial unava.:l.labilltiesll , one has to sum the partial unavailabilities in
the following way
vlhere
U N.• J
---L = E
l-U i=1j
(18)
"j" indicates group "j"
nji" ind1cates shut dm-rn state "ji" belonging to group ur'
Uji = partial not availability due to shut do~vn state lIji"
N. = number of ehe shut down states belonging to group "jn.
J
Fig. 12 shows a schemat1c diagram of the major components of a nuclear power
plant. A major component, with associated auxiliary parts to make it to function
and safety subsystems to protect it against acc1dents,will be called "block".
A "block" 1s therefore a group of subsystems. A "block" 'VIill be said unavailable,
when it does not perform the function for llhich it has been built. For instance,
the primary coolant pump (block No. 2) uill be not aval1able, if 1t does not
maintain the primary coolant in circulation. All the partial unavailabilities,
which contribute to the unavailability of a block, will be grouped together to
give the unaval1ability of the block.
With reference to fig. 12, we can define the following uine blocks
Block No. 1 Reactor
Block No. 2 Primary Coolant Pump
Block Ho. 3 Steam Generator
Block No. 4 Primary Circuit
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Block Ho. 5 Turbine
Block No. 6 Eiectric Generator
Block No. 7 Condenser
Block No. 8 Hater Pump
Block No. 9 Secondary Circuit
The division of the plant in blocks is a matter of convenience and 1s somewhat
arbitrary. The designer may find more convenient to divide the plant in blocks
different from those listed above.
The plant unavailability "Ull liJ'ill be given by:
u
._- =
1-U
11 U.
L _J_
j=1 1-Uj
(19)
vlhere "1'1" 1s the total number of the blocks. In the case of fig. 12 live have M=9.
One can also divide the blocks in sub-blocks and these in subsystems.
The IIb10ck unavailability" "U. II liJ'ill be a function of the 1lpartial unavailabilities ll
Jtuj i" according to eq. 18. lIe sha11 nm,] analyse an example to shoW' hOlT to ca1cu-
late "u nj •
Fig. 13 show's a schematic diagram of the primary coolant pump LB10ck No. 'l:.7.
Theprimary coolant pump 1s driven by an electric motor, 'which is fed from the
power supp1ies subsystem. The pump bearings are cooled with oil, which is
maintained in circulation by means of the oi1 pumps subsystem. It is important
to point out that this example is made purposely simple, because we intend to
i1lustrate the princip1es and not to solve a practica1 case. Let us now continue
with our example. The safety system has the purpose to save the major components
(reactor, primary co01ant pump) against accidents. It is clear that, from safety
point of view, the reactor will have first priority. This means that, if a
choice must be done between reactor and pump, we sha1l choose to save the reac-
tor first and after the pump. If the oil pressure decreases, (which is dangerous
for the bearings), it IiJill be detected by the "oil pressure measuring channels"
(S21), which will first shut the reactor dOl~ (through the intermediate relays
network 814 and the reactor actuators S15) and after will suitch the pump drive
motor off (through the intermediate relays network 822 and the pump actuators
823). This sequence of actions is obtained through a feedback from the reactor
actuators (815) to the input of the intermediate re1ays network (822).
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If the voltage to the pump drive motor fails 5 the pump will stop and this will
produce a big teactor cccident (loss of coolant flcw äccidertt). For this reason
die ","01 tage is meatil'red by the ll'Joltage mCJ.suring ehannelsl! (811) 5 'tvhich uill
shut the reactor do't;n through 814 and 815.
The safety system includes also tuo other trips: one for low coolant flow (SI2)
and the other for high reactar outlet coolant temperature (SI3).
He shall call "initial eventn any failure of a functional subsystem or of a
safety subsysten 5 which brings the plant to a failed state (shut dOvffi or
disaster). Far the sake of simpllcity, we shall suppose that only some of the
functional subsystems belonging to the block No. 2 (primary coolant pump) can
fai1. They Cl.re
Functional Su.bsystem l\Io 0 F21 = C~il pt1121pS subsystem
Functional Subsystem No. F22 = Oil circuit subsystem (oil leakage)
Functicnal SubSyst.cZl No. T:'!'1"'\ _. Po'tvTer supplies 8u,b3ystem.r: t...J
A functional subsystem will be indicated 't7ith the letter iipil follovJed by tuo
or more figures 5 the first Hgnrc he:7.ug the nu.'1lbcr of the block to \vhich the
functional subsystem belongs.
The safety subsystems, which belang to thc block No. 2~ are those which protect
the primary coolant pUTI'_p and e::actly
Safety Subsystem 821 =mcasuring channels of oil pressure
Safety Subsystem 822 = pump intermediate relay-s net\1ork
Safety Subsystem 823 = pump act1Jators
A safety subsystem \Jill be indicated tJith th.e letter "Sll fol101ived by tHO or
more figures~ the first figure being the number of the block to vn.ich the
safety subsystem belcngs.
The safety subsystem 821 acts on the intermediate relays network 814 and 822,
and protects bath primary coolant Plli~P and reactor against accidents. The
safety subsystem 821 can therefore be assigned either to the block No. 2
(primary coolant pump) or to tbe block No. 1 that i5 the reactor.
We have thought to assigne the structure of the oil pressure neasuring channels
(821) to the block of the primary coola.nt pump (No. 2), because the oil pressure
is strictly related to the good operation of the ptrnp bearings. In this case
the unavailability of thc re;1ctor is a consequence of the not ava:Uability of
the primary coolant PUID'9 be.ccmse the ptrrnp is not allowed to function uith
- 31 -
too low oll pressure at the bearings.
The assignement of a safety subsystem to a block instead of another may be a
matter of personal judgemerit clf the designer. But the designer must be very
careful~ when he makes th~ di~ision of the plant in blocks, that he does not
assigne the same shut ddtm state to twq di~ferent blocks. In order to avoid
the
this error, he mUst: check that list of the shut dOvffi states grouped in a
block c6ntairis onl)" those having as "initial events il the failures of the
functionäl and safety subsystems whieh he has assigned to the block.
The safet)" subsystems
S11 (measuring channels of stator voltage)
812 (measuring channels of primary coolant flml)
S13 (mea~uring channels of reactor outlet temperature)
814 (reactor int"ermediate relays net'vork)
815 (reactor actuators)
belong to the reaetor block (No. 1) because they protect only the reactor
against accidents.
Now we can illustrate the procedure to calculate the not availability U2 of
block No. 2. The initial events which must be considered are only those linked
to failures of the subsystems belonging to block l~. 2 and exactly~ F21, F22,
F23, 821, 522, 823. For the safety subsyste11.1s only the failure type ab n can
initiate a shut do,vu.
The shut down states of block 2 are the follo1;..ring
8hut down State No. 21 = on pumps subsystem failed
Shut dmvu State No. 22 = on circuit subsystem failed
Shut dmvu State No. 23 = PmJer supplies subsystem failed
Shut down State No. 24 = Primary coolant pump failed
Shut dOvffi State No. 25 = False Trip (failure type "bi! of a safety subsystem).
We want to point out that the failure of the primary coolant pump (shut d01;m
state 24) can be due either to the failure of the oil pumps subsystem, or to
that of the oil circuit. Strictly speaking we should have two different shut
down states with primary coolant pump failed. However, since the time needed
to repair the pump is much longer than thos~ needed to repair the oil pumps
and the oil circuit, we can group the two snut dOvffi states together in one alone.
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The same considerations have guided us in grouping all the false trips in one
state alone (state 25).
In general we can say that all the shut dOlYn states, which belong to the same
block, and which are characterized by the same (or almost the same) repair rate
"'Pli and shut down cost IIßIi, can be grduped in one state alone. This state ~lil1
have the same f~pa!~ tate arid repait cost, and a f~tlure rate eqtial to the sum
of the failure rates of all the shut dotvn states which have beeh grouped to-
gether.
Fig. 14 shows the trees to go from the initial events to the shut do~m states
for block No. 2. Each tree is shown in details from fig. 15 to fig. 19. These
trees give all the minimal paths to go from the initial events to the shut dot~
state to which the tree refers.
Prom the analys~s of these trees, Qne realizes immediately that, in order to
go to the shut dOt~ state, some subsystems are required to fail and sorne other
safety subsystems are instead required to function. At the time of the failure
of a functional subsystem, the probability that a safety subsystem (related to
it) has not failed is much higher than the probability that it has already
failed. We sha11 not make therefore any appreciab1e error in the evaluation of
the failure rate of a minimal path, if we suppose that the safety subsystem,
which is required to function, has a probability equal to 1 to function.
The table of fig. 20 shows all the minimal paths of all the trees be10nging to
block No. 2. Here, for each minimal path, on1y the subsystems vn1ich are required
to fail are showu. The minimal paths are shol1n horizontal1y~ the sign il+" in
the column of a subsystem indicates that the subsystem is required to fail.
For the safety subsystems we have, as usually, the ttV'o types of failure f1a"
and f1bu.
He shall indicate vlith "ufl the rates of occurrence (or failure rates) of the
minimal paths, with H>"FIl the failure rates of the functional subsystems and
liTith VI>"S" the failure rates type "bl! of the safety subsystems.
For the shut dmm. state 21 and 22 (fig. 20) we have respectively
(20)
(2I)
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For the shut dOvffi state 23 we have
(22)
Looking ~t figo 20~ one realizes immediately that the rates of occurrence of
the minimal paths 232 and 233 are much sma1ler than the rate of occurrence of
the minimal path 231
(23)
~d
where KSlI and KSI2 are the reduÖti6n cö~tficleftts respectively of the safety
stibsystefus $11 and Sl2 änd HS11 ;S12 is the coupling coefficient between the
safety subsystems Sll and SI20 Both these coefficients have been defined in
para. 2.
Taking into account 23 and 24~ eq. 22 becomes
(25)
For the shut down state 24~ we notice the following (fig. 20)
(26)
~d
(27)
Taking into account 26 and 27, we can write (fig. 20)
(29)
(30)
(31)
(32)
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(33)
(34)
where tvith "IeS" we have indicated the reducdon coefficients of tlie vaHous
safety subsystems.
Taking into account eqs. 29 to 34, eq. 28 becomes
(35)
For the shut dovm state 25 we notice that (fig. 20)
(36)
and
(37)
Taking into account the expressions 36 and 37, we can write
(38)
Since we have (fig. 20)
(39)
(40)
(41 )
eq. 38 becomes
(42)
Eqs. 20, 21, 25, 35 and 42 gives the rates of occurrence of the ~hut dovm
states of block 2 as function of the characteristics of the functional and
safety subsystems.
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Since the not availability of block Ho. 2 is given by
(43)
we have to calculate all the repair rates iI'JlZi!l.
The repair rate ilIY2i
Vi is the reciprocal of the mean time needed to bring the
power station from shut doun state il2i ll back into normal operation (state 0).
This mean time must include the time needed to repair the subsystems which
have failed and that needed to start the plant up again. The repair rates are
therefore also very mueh dependent upon tue way in which the repair actions
are earried out and organized (for example upon the number of the repair crews).
Their values must be obtained by collecting and analysing data eoming from
experience gained with tue operation of previous power plants similar to that
whieh the designer takes llilder consideration.
In general for a block 11.;11J having "N. VI shut down states ~ '-le can writeJ
1'1
...\1.
J U ••
L: J~
u .• +IY ••
r =
i=1 J1. J1. (44)u. N.J 1 \) ..
.J J1.1 + L
i=1 u.. +IY ••J1. J1.
5.3 The overlapping coefficient. Its definition and its influence on the
"plant unavailability"
Taking into account that
average time needed to bring the plant into operation from shut
and
1
u. = --------------------------- = --
1. average time interval bet~ileen tt·lO shut down states Hili toi
w. =-----------------------------....:.--1.
(1)
=--
t .
r1.
(2)
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the partial unavailabiilty Ü. (eq. 16 of ~ara. 5.2j cart alsb Be wtitten as
~
follotJS
(3)
Putting eq. 3 in eq. 15 of para 5.2, 'Vle get for the plant unavailability IfU"
a.
~
1:1 t
riE --.--
i::;1 t oiU = N t
ri1 + E
-"-
i=1 t oi
If we indicate vlith uT II a long time interval > ,;je have
o
T (l-U)
ot.=~---
o~
(4)
(5)
tvhere "a." is the expected number of times that the shut dotm state
~
"il! occurs in the time interval "T
o
il
• Putting 5 in 4, O;1Te get finally
E ai tri Ti=1 rU ==-~--- =T T
o 0
(6)
where 1fT 11 is the total time during vlhieh the plant is in shut dotm. This total
r
repair time is given~ as shotmby eq. 6, by summing the lengths of time !laitri il ~
where "a.t .11 is the total length of time spent by the plant in the shut dOvrn
l. rl.
state "i". This means that~ in the m.odel developed in para 5.2~ no overlapping
among the individual repair times "a.t .n has been taken into account. He have
l. r~
practieally supposed that a failure of a subsystem ereates a situation so
dangerous for the plant, that immediate shut dOtm i5 required.
lIany till1es the failure of a subsystem does not bring the potJ'er station in a
so dangerous situation that immediate shut dOvffi is required. In other words,
there are different degrees of danger. Take,for instance, the case of the pres-
sure of the oil uhieh eools the bearings of the primary eoolant pump (fig. 13).
If a leakage occurs in the oil circuit~ the pressure will start to decrease
and~ when it falls beyond a certain value, there 1;1i11 be an alarn. The opera-
ting crew will find out what has caused this alarm~ and~ on the basis of the
evaluation of the amount of oil uhich is heing lost from the oil circuit; can
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decide either to shut the plant dOvffi and to repair the oil circuit immediately,
or to wait for the next routine maintenance. It may happen that, ':'\Thile VJaiting
for the next routine plant maintenance, the oil pressure decreases beyond a
value so low that the safety system shuts automatically the plant dotm. On the
other hand, it may also happen that) ~hile waiting for the routine plant mainte~
nance, the failure of another subsystem occurs J which shuts the plant do\vu, and
then both the damages will be repaired at the same time.
The above considerations bring to the conclusion that the repair times for the
various subsystems may overlap one with another. This eff~et, as already said)
has not been taken into account in the model described in para 5.2. The degree
of overlapping depends upon the type of the plant, the repair policy fol1mved
by the cre,:v ':Ihich operates the plant etc.
It seems convenient therefore to define an iloverlapping coefficiene&', s , to
- ~ p
be determined from operating experience. For the definition of this coefficient
we should refer to the partial unavailabitities Ui • Since this would be probably
too complicate beca~se of the large number of shut do,:m states, we shall refer
to the unavailabilities of the blocks.
Hith reference to Hg. 12, \V(~ shaU deHne 1Is i1 as foUoHs (according to a defini-p
tion suggested by Dr. Vetter and his cowork~rs of the R.U.E. Essen)
a U. U
I
_J__
= j=1 I-U. I-lis J (7)
P M: U. U
I
-L __~
j=1 I-li I-Uj m.
,"here
U = plant unavailability
U. = i1unavailabilityn of block ilj 11
J
Um = unavailability of the block "m" characterized by having the
maximum among the block unavailabilities "u ilj
M = number of blocks (equal to 9 in fig. 12)
Prom 7 we get
U
I-U
11 U. U
= (1 ) '" __...L. + m
-s t.. I-U. s l-U
P j=1 J P m
(8)
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The overlapping coefficient "s il lies ahvays between 0 and 1p
o < s < 1
P
lilien there is no overlapping, ,;V'e have
s = 0p
and eq. 8 becomes
U M U.
_- E _J_
l-U - j=l l-Uj
which is equal to eq. 19 of para 5.2.
The case
s = 1P
corresponds to complete overlapping.
(9)
(10)
(I I)
(12)
With complete overlapping we mean the case, in which the repairs of the blocks
would be all carried out within the repair time of the block which has the
maximum unavailability U •
m
In this case eq. 8 becomes:
U
--=l-U
U
m
}-U
m
(13)
5.4 The average failure rate of a functional subsystem as function of the
characteristics of its units for different strategies
In paragraph 5.2 vle have shotm how the "plant unavailability "Un can be expressed
as function of the failure rates " AF ll and tlAgtl of the functional and safety
subsystems and of the reduction coefficients "Keil of the safety subsystems. He
L)
vlant now to express the failure rate " AF" of a functional subsystem as function
of the characteristics of its units. The failure rate ""T?" depends also upon
..
the type of strategy which is adopted. Here we give the results only for a
limited number of strategies. The details of the mathematical developments
are given in Appendix 7.
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5.4.1 Strategy 1.~ Functional subsystem consisting of a unit only
The sußsystem täiIs if the unit fails we have simply
(1)
\vhere
t =
°F =
hF(t) =
°
=p
time
average failure rate of the unit
failure probability density distribution of the unit
maintenance period
In the case in which no preventive maintenance is planned (0F = 00), eq. 1
becomes
AF = °F
1=---~-- (2)
5.4.2 Strategy 2~ Functional subsystem consisting of two units one working and
the other in stand-by. No preventive maintenance.
If the working unit fails, it i9 automatically switched off, while the stand-by
unit is at the same time automatically switched into operation. The failed unit,
after repair, is connected again as stand-by unit. The subsystem fails if the
unit, which is working, fails before the repair of the other unit has been
completed.
He have
where
0p
AF =-----"':"1---
1 + -----:----*
1 - 11m (h'fi'·G.,.,)
_ J:
s~o
(3)
(4)
Gp(t) = repair cumulative probability distribution of the unit =
= ltgF(t)dt
o
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gF(t) = repaif prdbäbility deri~ity d1stribdtion of the uuit
(5)
s = complexvariable of the Laplace domain
n;lE" indicates Laplace transformation
For the particular case in which the failure probability distribution 1s
exponential
1 -
hF(t) =~ exp(-o~t)F r:
eqo 3 becomes
°F
Ar - --1-+------~1----
~OOgF(t) exp(-oFt)dt
If also "'F(t) i5 exponential
gi t ) = ]JF exp(-]JFt )
tiTe have
t'1here
]J = repair rate of the unitF
Since ]Jr/oF i8 usually very large~ eqo 9 can be written as follows
° 2
A !:'!..l:-
F ]JF
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
It is very interesting to remind that eqo 10 holds approximately also in the
case in whichgp(t) is not exponentiaL In this case
]J~ = average repair rate of the unit = ----~------
~ [t
The demonstration is given in Appendix 7
(lI)
5.4~3 Strategy 3: Funetional subsystem eonsisting of two units~ one working end
the other in stand-by. Preventive maintenanee.
It is similar to strategy No. 2 with the differenee that the working unlt is
alSo prev~rltively replaeed after having been used aperiod of time "8.....".
J!
~'1e have
lvhere
(13)
The following expression holds~ only approximately~ in the ease that gF(t) is
any arbitrary distribution
(14)
where
UF is defined by eq. 14
sud ~F is defined by eq. 11
I
5.4.4 Strategy 4 :\Functional subsystem consisting of "nF" units :"~lt of these
T'~nits are 'tV'orking and the others IInF-kFu are in stand-by. No
l preventive maintenance.
\ -
If one of the working units fails~ it is automatically switehed off, while the ~'
first of the stand-by units is at the same time automatically switehed into
operation. If a second unit fails, the second of the stand-by units comes into
operation and so on. The failed units ~ after repair", are mounted again as stand-
by units.
The subsystem fails if nF-kF+l units are failed. Be have solved this ease only
N'ith hF(t)and gF(t) being both exponential functions. vJe obtain
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k.",(JJi
l! '"
AF = -n-:--i-'-""':k-p-.+-::'I-i-(---ll--F--:~(;-n-F-_l~~-+-:I:-_-:i:'-)
E Jr.....,(JFi=1 .t'
In the particular case kF=1 (only one unit working)~ eq. 15 becomes
(15)
(I6)
Since llF!(JF is usually very large~ ue have also that eq. 15 can be '-1ritten
approximately
In the case kp=1 9 eq. 17 becomes
uF(Jp
(I 7)
(18)
5.4.5 Strategy 5: Functional subsystem consisting of "nF" units: I1kF
ii of these
units are 'tvorking and the others ilnp-kp" are in stand-by. Pre-
ventive maintenance.
It is similar to strategy No. 4 with the difference that the working units are
also preventively replaced after having been used aperiod of time He....".
t!
(19)
where (Jp and llF are given respectively by eqs. 11 and 14.
For k~=1 eq. 19 becomes
(20)
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5.5 TPJe,r~\:1uction and coupling coefficients and the average failure rate of a
safety subsystem as function of the characteristics of its units
The parameters of the safety subsystems have already been defined in para. 3,
where they are given as function of the characteristics of the units which make
the subsystems. Rere we repeat only these expressions. The mathematical develop-
mants to obtain thern are given in the Appendices 3 and 4.
For the reduction coefficient IlKS" of a safety subsystem vIa have
nlS(ng) !(pSTS>KS = -;--~:"':"'"':'-;-=:;.,...:;..-...,-:­(ms+J)! (ng-mg)!
'i'1here
(1)
ns =number of the units which belong to the safety subsystem
l':l~ = number of the units 'tV'hich must faU in order to make the unit
tJ
to faU (failure type "a")
TS = checking period
Ps = average failure rate (failure type "a") of a unit and is given
by eq. 4 of para. 2
Fig. 3 shO'i'1S qualitatively "Ps" as function of "OS" and "TS'" Figs. 4, .5 and
6 shmJ "KS
ti as function of the parameter "PS1:8" for different values of tlms"
and tlnSn. To obtain a smaller value of "KS"~ one can think to reduce "TS"
(figs. 4~ 5 and 6). But if oue reduces "TS" , Ps increases (fig. 3), vlhich means
that the units fail more often. The designer will be compelled to make a
compromise between these two competinß effects.
Por the intercoupling coefficient IInll among illilil safety subsystems, ue have
(2)
The failure rate "AS
il due to false trip (failure type lIbli) of a safety subsystem
i5 given by
(3)
w-here
25 = number of the units whieh must fai1 in order to make
the unit to fail
Os = average failure ra.te (fa11ure type Ub U) of a unit and
1s given by eq. 5 of para. 2
~ = average repair rate of a unitS ~-
"11 iI· • b ' f 1-' .~S ~s g~ven y tne 0 lowLug equat~on
(4)
ß,..(t)dt
,:,
livhere
8,..(t) = repa1r probability density distribution for a unit.
"
Since ~s/os 1s usually very large~ eq. 3 becomes
Q,
S
°
For the safety subsystems the following relation may hold
(5)
.Q,s = -m S (6)
5.6 The annual shut dmm cast uBil
The second term. of the annual lass funetion iiZil i5 lIBH , vJhich represents the
expected ffiluual ecst to repair aue to start the plant up after shut dotvn. As
we have done for the plant unavailabi11ty (para. 5.2L vve can also in th1s
case associate to each block the corresponding annua1 cost for repa1r and
start-up
H
B = l: B.
j=1 J
(I)
vJhere B. 1s the st,art-up cost related to block uf' ~ and ''1:1'' 1s the number of
J
the blocks.
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Tf we indicate t1ith iiN. 11 the number of shut down states itlhich have been associated
J
to block 11 j fI s 't'le have
Nj
B. = r B.•
J 1=1 J1.
(2)
where B.. is the annual shut down cost associated to shut dot-m state i1j 1" •
J1.
Finally if ''Te indicate t"lith IIU •• tI the rate of occurrence of shut dovm state "ji lt
J1.
and itlith "ßji" the shut dot-m cost associated to shut dom.L state ilji
H
s it1e have
ß
J
.1.. u .•J1.
(3)
Taking into account eqs. 2 and 3 s eq. 1 becomes
B = ~~,NJ~ l'(Bji UJ' i _),'j=1 i=1
5.7 The annual subsystems cost liC"
(4)
As already done for the plant unavailability and the shut dot-m cost, we can write
11
C·= r
j=1
C.
J
(1)
where
Cj = annual cost of the subsystems belonging to block "j"
M =number of the blocks
Tf we indicate 1.v1th "CFj1
il the annual cost of the functional subsystem "ji ll and
tlith ilC il that of the safety subsystem Ilji ll both belonging to block "j ii ~ tveSj!
have
L. A.] J
Cj = r C'"C'_ • + r1=1 ~ J 1. i=1
(2)
'{'There "L. if and HA." are respectively the number of functional and safety sub-
J J
systems belong1ng to block "j".
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5:7.1 Fhn~ttörtal Subsystems
The annual cost pi a functional subsystem 18 given by
where
CFj1 = Ev ··+... J1. V· + YFji Fji (3)
Eto •i = annual capital cost of subsystem Hp .• Il. This cost includes~J J1.
the design~ construction and installation costs divided by
the number of years during which the plant is expected to be
in operation. The annual interests of the invested capital
must be also included.
= annual operating cost of subsystem nF .. 1l
J1.
= annual maintenance cost of subsystem HF .. 11
J1.
Now we shall express the costs EFji , VFji and YPji as functions of the costs of
the units which belong to the subsystem 111;' I:
"'ji •
For the sake of simplicity~ let us drop the subscript llji ll •
He have
and
(4)
(5)
(6)
nr = total number of units belonging to the functional subsystem
er = annual capital cost of a unit
k.". = number of the lJorking units
l:
v' = annual operating cost of a l,mrking unitF
v" = annual operating cost of a stand-by unitF
0F = maintenance period (years)
yi = cost of a non preventive replacement (or repair)
y~ = cost of a preventive replacement (or repair)
Xp =expected nmrrber of non preventive replacements in the time
interval 110 ifF 0
- 47 -
n~H is given by the following equation tvhich has been obta.ined in Appendix 8
where
(7)
-1L indicates antitransformation from the Laplace to the time domain
"*" ihdidl.tes Laplace transformation
s = complex variable of the Laplace domain
'*hF(s) = Laplace trans form of h(t)
h~(t) = failure probability density distribution of a unit
.l!
5.7.2 Safety Subsystems
The annual cost of a safety subsystem i8 given by
where
ESji = annual capital cost of subsystem lISjill.
This cost includes the design, construction
and installation costs divided by the number
of years during which the plant is expected
to be in operation. The annual interests of
the invested capital must be also included
VSji = annual operating cost of subsystem "Sji"
YS" = annual maintenance cost of subsystem IISji
ll
J1.
(8)
Now we shall express the costs ES"~ VS' i and Y~'i as functions of the costs ofJ 1. J ~J
the units which belong to the subsystem "Sji".
Also here, for the sake of simp1icity~ we drop the subscript Hji".
He have
(9)
(10)
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(11)
where
ns = total hdmber of the units which belong to the safety subsystem
eS ~ arlnual capital cdst of a uri!t
Vs = annual operating cost of a unit
Os =maintenance period
Yg = cost of a non preventive replacement (or repair)
Y~ = cost of a preventive replacement
Xs = expected number of non preventive replacemen~ in the time
interval "OS".
ilXS" 1s given by the following equation which has been obtained in Appendix 9
1os 1X s = 0 L r -*hS(s, T S'_* dtLI - hs(s~'t(") !.:> J (12)
'<there
TS = checking period
-* -hS(S~TS) = Laplace transform of hS(t,TS)
hS(t,TS) is the total failure probability density distribution and i8 given
by the following equation
where
(13)
hg(t) = failure probability density distribution (failure type "a")
h"(t) = failure probability density distribution (failure type IIb")S
8' = const.S
eS" = const.S
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6. The rate of occurrence " UdH of a fldlsaster" as function of the characteristics
of the units of the plant
The rate of occurrence "ud" of a disaster (big accident) is obtained by summing
the rates of occurrence of 0.11 the minimal paths to go from "normal operation ll
(state 0) to the Udisaster stateH (fig. 11)
N
ud = L udi (1)1=1
Hhere
U,. = rate of occurrence associated 1:0 the minimal path I1j/l
eil-
N = number of the minimal paths
Strictly speaking) eq. 1 1s valid only approximately. One should really sum the
probabilities of all the mutually exclusive events:; Vlhich bring to the lldisaster
statell :; to get the total probability iiQd"'
From this total probability one should calculate ud
dQd!dt
I -f'l
'''cd
(2)
However) since Qd 18 extremely small) one does not make any appreciable error if
one instead uses the more simple eq. I.
As dope for the plant unavailabiJ,ity) here tao t'l7e sh.;tll illustrate the calculation
of the rate of occurrence H Udll for the particular case of the scheme shm:m in
fig. 13. Ue shall suppose that only the subsystems F2I:; F22:; F23~ SII, 812:; 813,
814, 815, 821, 822, 823 can fail.
The lIDisaster Tree", v1ith a11 the minimal paths to go from the initial events
to the lIDisaster State", is shown in Hg. 21. roJe have also supposed that the
feedback from subsystem "S1S" to ilS22" is 100 % reliable. From the analysis
of this tree~ one realizes that some subsystems are required to fail and some
other safety subsystems are instead required to function.
At the time of the failure of a functional subsystem~ the probability that a
safety subsystem (related to it) has not failed is much higher than the proba-
bility that it has already failed. We shall not make therefore any appreciable
error in the evaluation of the failure rate of 0. minimal path, if ue shall suppose
that the safety subsystem 9 which i8 required to function, has probability equal
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to t to function. Fig. 22 shows all the minimal paths~ only the subsystems which
are required to fail have been includedo
From fig. 22 we get
15
ud =.t ud!
~=1
il1here "udi It is the rate of occurrence of the minimal path lii ii 0
From fig. 22 we obtain also
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)
(9)
(10)
(11)
(12)
(t 3)
(14)
(15)
(16)
tl7)
- 5 J .J
Ua1 5 =Hst1 ,StZ·KS11 KS12 A2~
vmere ehe reductiibrt läctor!i äiia die HMlplitig cdefIictentl.Hljthesafety subsystems
ha'\te been irtJicated respectively ,;..rith "Ks"and i'nti ; aha iiiie~ailure rates of. tlte
var!ous subsystems have been indicated ';vith "A". The equatiods to ealculate tdie
"KS" and "Hit coefficients are given in the paragraphs 2 and 5.5.
The equations for the failure rates of the functional and safety subsystems are
given respectively in paragraphs 5.4 and 5.5.
(1)
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7. Final qonside,rat$.ons. on the ,annpal lass, function i~ZIi
In the preceeding paragraphs ~'Je have ShOim hmv to express the annual 10ss "zn
as functiort of thedharacteristlcsöf the mUtS of the plant.
The designer can choose each unie a~bug the different types available on the
market. The best constellätion cf choices will be that which gives the minimum
va1ue of "i ft ahd at: the same d.me satisfies the constraint that the rate of
öccurrertce ~liJtt of a disaster is smaller than the value i1 v 11 fixed by thed max
safety committee.
To deve10p in details a mathematical method to find the mininum of "Z" is a task
il1hH:h needs to be solved~ but \-1hich e~r.(:.eeds the limits of our raport •
Ne sha11 make here only some considerations on a particular procedure, which
seems to us at the moment to be very convenient.
Ne sha11 indicate with [U!(l-U)]Pji the quantity U!(l-U) ca1culated by putting
in it equa1 to zero the failure rates end reduction coefficients of all the
safety subsystems and the fellure rates of all the functional subsystems with
the exception of the functional subsystem "Pji".
Be shall indicate with [U!(l-U)J~" the quantity U/(l-U) calculated by putting
0J:l.
in it equal to zero the fallure rates and reduction coefficients of all the
safety subsystems with the exception of the sarety subsystem "Sji". To ca1culate
U!(l-U) S" one needs therefore to know also the fai1ure rates of the functional]J.
subsystems, which are multiplied by K~ •• o
.,J J.
In the same r..vay for the annual shut dOl'm costs "B", ,!;'1e define the two quantities
i1B 11 and "B nFj! Sji •
Ue can nOiv deHne the functional partial axmual 10ss functions "Z IiFji
ZF'i = (l-s )(I-U) [l~ul PTy + BF'~ + CFjiJ P [-Fji .. J ...
whera "Sp il is the overlapping coefficient.
For example, in the case of the fvnctional subsystem F21 (oi1 pumps subsystem
in fig. 13), we have
(2)
He can also define the safety partial annual 10ss function "ZSj iiv
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(3)
For example, in the case of the safety subsystem 821 (oil pressure measuring
channels in fig. 13), we have
+ AS2IJ- +
qr 25
(4)
We shall S8.y that a safety partial annual loss function ItZ • fI 15 related to a5Ji
functional partial annual 10ss function uZT<' n if "z . 11 contains the failure
". xn SJ i
rate of the functional subsystem "Fxn ll • For instance "Z It (eq. 4) is related821
t "z "(e 2) b ~.f f- t' ~o F21 q. . ecau::;e '" ~ con al.ns A r 21'
For the functional and safety su.bsystems, '"lhich belong to the block "m" having
the maximum unavailability, "Je shall instead llrite
and
Zp .In1- = (l-U) PTy [U-J + BFmi + CFml.·l!-U Fm! (5)
Taking into account eq. 8 of para. 5.3, we can ~~ite
U = (l-s )(I-U) {':' -lLf (I~U) + Ai (I~U) J} +
P j=1 i=l Fji i=1 Sj'
j~
(6)
where
+ (I-U) ~~I Am+ 'Ei=1 (I~U) J.Smi (7)
U = plant unavailability
S = overlapping factorp
M = number of blocks
Lj = number of functional subsystems belonging to block "j"
Aj = number of safety subsystems belonging to block "j"
and ''m'' indicates the block having the maximum unavailability.
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Taking into aeeount eq. 7 9 one ean easily prove that
where all the ZF" and ES •.•. are given respectively by eqs.
J1.. J1.
by eqs. 5 and 6 fot jem~
(8)
and 3 ror j t/:tn and
The procedure to find out the fuin2.TIlt1ll1 of the armual 10ss funetion can be now
d~seribed~ It consists öf the following steps:
St.epllo •. t Frbtn previous operating experience we know already Hhat is the
block having the maXL'TIUIn unav~dlabi1ity "Um". He kno'w also the
value of the overlapping coefficient Hg H.
P
He assume for the plant unavailability an initial va1ue "U nin
coming from previous operating experience (for instance Uin=O.l).
T.Je use this value !lu. Ii in the funetional partial annual 10ss
J..n
funetions HZ...... n definad by eqs. 1 and 5. He find the type of
1! J1.' .
unit 9 the stratesy 8n(! the maintenance period of subsystem "Fji"9
lvhieh give the minimum of "Z....... ".
1: J 1.
For each subsystem IlPji l1 9 He get the optimum failure rate AF' ..J1.
Step No. 2
b h · h HZ n h ·h ..Y 1:'1 l.C Fj i as t e O1.n1.J::mm.
He use the values Ap' ~ i in the safety partial 10ss fttnctions "z .. VI
_.J SJ1.
defined by eqs. 3 and 6. Be find the type of unit, the maintenance
period 9 the checking period 9 the total number of units and the type
f t f b S h · h' b .. f "z "o s ructure 0 st!; system ji9 .'17 l.c. g1.ve t.e m1.n1.mum 0 Sji.
It is important to notice that the constraint
Ud < Umax
must be also satisfied.
For eaeh subsystem
eoefficient llKSI' .. "
J1.
has the minimum.
"sj i 11 "Je get the optimum values of the reduetion
and of the feilure rate HA' n by v1hieh "z "Sji "Sji
Step No. 3 We use the values Apji ? A~ji and K~ji to calculate the plant unavaila-
bility (eq. 7).
He get the value UI' l'7hieh may be d:tfferent from "Uin".
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Step No. 4 He repeat the steps ]9 2 and 3 until the values of U converge to
a final value.
In this way we h~ve found separately the minimals of all the partial annua1 loss
functions "ZFjill and "ZSji". He get the minimum of \'Zliby using eq. 8.
This pr6cedure is valid on1y if th~ IfiS_in are one ormore orders of magnitudeJ
smaller than the related "Zr;' .it ~ tv'ben they are near to their minimäls. That is
J. nx
Thls should be normal1y the case (see numerical example of para, 4)9 because
a safety subsystem has usually a very low value of the reduction coefficient
-5
"KS" «JO ) and a subsystem annual cost "eS" much smaller than that of each of
the functional subsystems which are related to it.
If the conditions "9!1 are not satisfied 9 one has to group together a11 the ZSji
and Zp which are re1ated.nx
The minimum of each group can then be found~ taking also into account that the
constraint (ud < ~max) must be also satisfied. The mathem?tical procedure would
be in this case much more complicated.
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80 Amore general approach to the evalüation of the säfety requirements of a
power planto.
In the modei described in the preceeding paragraphs we have made the following
two hypothesis for the evaluation of the disaster failure rate
(i) It is possible to go to the "Disaster" state only from the
"Normal Operation" state.
(ii) A disaster is always caused by ~ombined feilures of functional
and safety subsystems.
These two assumptions may not always be valido A typical example is that of the
"meltdown accident of a dry and subcritical core due to fission product heat"
in the case of Sodium cooled fast reactors (BibI. B16). This would be a case~
in which the failure of a functional subsystem (i.e. the vessel subsystem which
contains Sodium and core) would lead directly to a disaster.
For this reason a still more general model can be developed (figo 27). We have
nOll "N" shut dmVIl states~ and from "n" of these it is possible to go to the
disaster state. Each disaster failure rate "Uti" will be given by
(l)
~vhere
Udi = rate of occurrence of a disaster caused by combined failures
of functional and safety subsystems, starting from state "i"o
AFSi= rate of occurrence of a disaster due to accidents which are
either not detectable or not controllable with the safety
system~ starting from state "i Il 0
For the calculation of "udi
li one can use the procedure shmm in para. 6.
Por the calculation of "AFSi"~ one has to sum the failure rates of all the
functional subsystems characterized by failures~ which bring the plant in a
dangerous situation if the plant is in state lIi Itsand l.rhich are either not
detectable or not controllable with the safety system.
\iJe shall indicate 'vith HQi" the probability that the plant is in state "i"
at time iit iI 0
Looking at fig. 27, we can v~ite the following equations
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dQ
o
dt =-
[
N
Q I: v1 +o 1=1
n
I:
1=0
N
t 'Pi Qi·
i=1
(2)
(3)
(4)
dQn+l
dt
= Q v - 'Y Qo n+l n+l n+l
•
N
I: Q1 + QD = 1
1=0
(6)
(7)
(8)
\oIe have VfN+3" equat10ns w1th "N+2" unknowns. On1y "N+2It equc1tions will be in-
dependent. The last one can be obta1ned by summing the first "N+2" equations.
According to what we have said in para. ,3 and para. 5.2~ alsohere we have that
the following property is satisfied
(9)
Taking into account the expression 9, the approximate solution for "Qi" 1s
given by
l'lhere
(i=O,1 ,2,. u,N) (JO)
and
"S " is the solution obtained from the first N+l equations (eqs. 2i
to 6) by putting all the "v iI equal to zeroti
(J1)
The functions "Si" are characterized by asymptotic values Si
co
which are reached
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in a very short period of time
1 +
~lThere
1S =--~--
oco N u.
E..2:.
i=1 If'i
(i=1 ~2~ ....N) (12)
(13)
Note that S was indicated in the previous paragraphs with A~.oCO ~
The initial values "s. 11 are
1.0
S = S (0) = 1
00 0
and
(14)
(i=1 ,2, ••• ,N) (15)
Taking into account eqs. 10 and 11, from eq. 7 ive get
Qn :< ~ u
t
. (tS.R.dt
i=O 1. Jo 1. 1. (16)
The occurrence rate
"
U
"
of a disaster will beD n
n E uti S.dQD!dt .E ut.S. exp(-ut . t) i=o 1.co1=0 1. 1.00 1. (17)UD = ~ ~l-Q n nD E S. exp(-ut , t) E s.i=o 1.co 1. i=o 1.co
If ~ve indicate i<71th "PSji" a functional subsystem w'hose failure starting from
plant state "i" 1s not contro1lab1e (or detectab1e) t1ith the safety system?
we cen tvrite
j=Di
AFSi = .EJ=1
A'l7S· .~ , J 1. (18)
where "Di" is the total number of the functional subsystems characterized by
failures which lead direct1y to a disaster if the plant is in state "iil. In
eq. 18 IIAPSjiil 1s the failure rate of the functional subsystem "pSji".
~<le can associate to each subsystem flPSj';iil its partial annua1 cost function "z . \1FSji
Each cf the ilZ 11 will be a decreasing function 'lith fiA~S'1".FSji ~. J
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The total annual cost n~SH of these particular functional subsystems 'tvill be
~s = i~1 ~!I ZpSjiJ (19)
In order to reduce the danserous effects due to a riudlear explosion (disaster)>>
the reactor may be provided with a containment sysf~cl capabie df absorbing the
explosive energy due"to a big accident» bnce that this has täkeri piace. Task
of the containment system, 1s also tö ävold the spreading of ehe tadioactive
products iri the sutröundtng atmosph~te.
It is becoming more and fuöte cleaf that the~e is not on1y one big accident, but
a spectrum bf possibie btg a~ciderlt~. To each accident one can associate the
correspondent deve10pab1e explosive mechanica1 energy "H"» so that a probability
density distribution of "vI" 'tvill describe the spectrum of accidents.
We ask now for the probability, K , that the containment system will fai1 to
c
absorb the explosive energy without rupture. For the sake of simplicity we sha1l
limit ourse1ves to considet on1y the shock wave effect. We shall imagine that
the containment system is just a cy1inder as shown in fig. 23 A. Fig. 23 B shows
the same cy1inder deformed after the explosion has taken place.
The explosive energy will produce the highest stresses at the mid plane of the
cy1inder (BibI. BI8). These stresses have a probability distribution, 4
s
' (curve
I of fig. 24) about the mean value, n, with a standard deviation, C •
s s
On the other side the strength of the material has also a probability distribution»
~t» (curve 2 of fig. 24) about the mean va1ue nt with a standard deviation ~t.
The two curves of fig. 24 may over1apand the amount of over1apping gives an
indication of hO't-l 1arge the probability "K " is» that during the explosion the
c
stress becomes 1arger than the strength.
The probability, p, that the strength nt is 1arger than a fixed va1ue ns is given
by (fig. 24)
The
(20)
than the stress 1s the fo11owing
.(21)
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If we assume that both ~s and ~t are normal distributions~ it cah be ShovID that
eq. 21 becomes
where ~m is the cumulative standardized normal distribution.
LiS
Eq. 22 can also be ~rritten as follows
Ke = $lls (_ ~:~-~n:~)
From eq. 23~ at each value of K ~ it corresponds a value of
c
n - nt s
1~2 + ~2
t s
(22)
(23)
(24)
For given values of ~tt ~s and nst we get the value of nt/ns~ which is directly
related to the wall thickness of the cylinder.
This procedure may lead to a rational evaluation of the safety factor nt/ns
and may avoid to overdesign the safety containment system.
The smaller is "K n t the higher n In will be, and the higher the thickness ofc t s
the safety container "lill be. He can conclude that the smaller is nK Vi, the
c
higher the annua1 cost HZ n of the container will be.
c
The probability of the event that a disaster takes p1ace and that the safety
container does not cope with the explosion is given by
(25)
with uD given by eq. 17.
rbw the constraint given by the safety committee can be written as follows
K \J < U
c D max
The total annual 10ss function HZ 11 will be given by
t
(26)
(27) .
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lVhere
Z =anhual 10$s function as defiried in para. 7
ZFS~ partial annual löss function given by eq. 19
Z ~ pattial anhtial löss function associated to the reactor
c
containment system
The problem has nolV became that of finding the minimum of the function UZt"!
(eq. 27) with the constraint defined by ~he expression 26.
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9. Appe~ix 1: Calculation of theay~~age fail~e rate of a unit belonging to
a functional subsystem
The sUbject cf thls appendix 1s to calculate the average fallure
rate" (5 !I of a unit belonging to a I'unctiönal sUbsystem.F
We introduce the following symbols:
"~(t)!1 = failure probability density distribution of the unit
!I t!l time
!I e "
F maintenance period, that is time between twopreventive replacements
The average failure rate "(5 !I (defined as reciprocal to the meantimeF
to failure) is given by
1
6F = meantime between two failures
Q
bF~(t)dt
(1)
Eq. 1 18 derived in thefollowing paragraph (A 1.2)
A 1.2 Calculation of !I6F"
A unit is characterlzed by its reliability "1);, where
p f unit is not failed at time "t" ~ (2)
(3)
Evaluating "~(t)" for the first maintenance period we get,
wi th "hF(t)" ,
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For the interval /..-Oit::!. g~, La. for tfql' main~nance PQriods,
we get, taking into account aq. 3,
J~ q~ (q. gF) = /:1- ~(t)dt J (4)o
where
We can write
q = 1,2, ....
t = q' GF + [
(5)
(~
Taking into account eqs 4 and 6, we get
f
/"-1- J~(t)dt J
o
(7)
The average failure rate "(5F", can be written as fo11ows
(5 =
F
1
j"'~(t)dt
o
(8)
where RF(t) is the reliability of the unit
The integral from "0" to "eo" of the function tf~(t)" can be
represented as a sum, i.e.
00
J~(t)dt =
o
q=O'J
l::
q = 0
(9)
By partial integration, we get
(10)
0.
J~ (t)dt =
o
Taking into account 10, we get from 9
1 f r G GGF _. GF- - 9FJF~dt - 1Ft~dtJ1- ["1- f ~dtJ 0 0
o
Putting 11 into 8, we get finally
(11)
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10. Appendix 2~ Calculation of tihe tt'J'()a,verag;~.;fa,Uur;e rat~~ ,of 3.,uni:töelonging
to a safety subsystem~.
The average failure rates flp .a atld 'ta. iI of a ühlE belonging tri a Säfety subsystemS 8
will be calculated in this Appendi~. They are dbtained in a way very similar to
that used to evaluate the railure rate of a unit belonging to a functional sub-
system. there are however tYO important distinctions to be made.
(1) Xt has to be taken into account that there are two types of failures:
a) Failure type Ha" (~vhen a safety unit does not function l-1hen it should)
b) Failure type ubu (toJhen a safety unit functions 'tvhen it should not).
(ii) The increased failure rate~ caused by "on-off-cyclingn (due to the
periodical testing of the units) has to be taken into account.
Let us indicate with hs(t) and hs(t) the two failure probability density distri-
butions of a unit respectively for failure type "au and failure type tlb ll •
The on-off-cycling has practically the effect to change the time scale of the two
failure probability cumulative distributions.
The coefficients by which the time scale is changed are
for failure type "aH (1)
and
for faUure type "b 11 (2)
with Os and o~ being two constants.
Introducing these tll0 coefficients~ the two new failure probability density distri-
butions~ which take into account the cycling effect~ will be respectively
and
(. + :~) bS{t(1+ ::)} (failure type "a")
f. °') { oi! 1\1 + r: h" t(t+ r:»)(failUre type ilb ll)
(3)
(4)
The total failure probability density distribution "h (t) It t<lill be given byS
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ttg(t) ~ tl+ ~:) hS{tO+ ::i} ][ -0+ ::)1\" ltO+ ::)}dt }
+(1+ ::) hS{tO+ ::)}] t-o+:;)1\'{tO+ ::) }dtJ (5)
With a procedure similar to that used in Appendix 1~ we can calculate the total
unit fEdlure rate IIpS+OS" where lIPSH 1s the failure rate for failure type "a"
and noS" 1s that for failure type "bI!.
l'lhere
Os =ma1ntenance per10d of a un1t
Be can wr1te also the following equations
(6)
Ps
PS+oS
and
(7)
Taking into account eq. 6~ eqs. 7 and 8 become finally
(8)
-_ ..._-----_._-------~--
cr =s
(9)
(10)
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11.Appendix 3: Calculation of the reduction and coupling coef~cients for
safety subsystems
A 3.1 The reduction coefficient "Ka
t' of a safety subsystem
Let us suppose we have a safety subsystem "S", which is related to the
functional subsystem "F". This means that when "F" fails, "S" (if not
already failed) will contribute to shut the plant down.
We shall indicate with 1lA-F the average failure rate of the functional
sUbsystem "F".
The safety subsystem "s" is made of "nS" units connected in such a way
that, if at the time at whieh "F" fails "kS" out of the Ir nS" units
have not already failed (failure type "a"), "SlI will operate correctly.
We remind here briefly (see para. 2) that the units of a safety sub-
system can have two types of failures:
(i) failure type "all. It occurs when the unit does not
operate when it is required to operate
(ii) failure type "~~ It oceurs when the unit does operate
when it is not asked to operate.
In this appendix we shall deal wi th failure type "a" only.
Going back to our subsystem "SlI, we can easily see that "s" will fail
if
(1)
units fail.
To find out that:-.a unit is failed with failure type lI a", it is neces-
sary to test it from time to time. We shall indieate with ft~" the
checking period, that i5 the time interval between two checks (tests).
We ask now for the probability lIPSF(t)" of the event that, at the time
1ft" at which "F" fails, "s" has already failed. We indicate with ft cxSF"
the probability that this event occurs in the time interval "'l3" between
two checks. The probability "PSF (qtg)", that the event oecurs during
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the f1~st n~1 checking intervals, is
PS" (q1\ = aSF [1 - PSF ['ts (q-1~ + PsFL7S «I-1)J (2)
Applying eq. 2 r~eatedly" we get
Eq. 3 1s valid only when 11 qll is an entire nu.nber.
We can write approximate1y
q =
Taking into account eq. 4, eq. 3 becomes
(4)
-Yt
e
where
y = -
"ts
Since aSF 1" we get finally from eq. 5
7's
"~;has been calculated in paragraph A 3.2 (eq.17). We have
(6)
where
jOs = average failure rate of a unit for failure
type "all defined by eq. 4 of para. 3
Taking into account eq. 12, eq. 11 becomes
where
"K 11 is cal1ed reduction coefficient.S
(8)
(9)
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Figs. 4; 5 and 6 show "KS" as function of "~?§"for different values
of "nS" and "mS".
A 3.2 Calculation of the probability"CXSF".
We want here to calculate the probability "es; of the event that the
saf'ety subsystem IlS" fails betore the funotionai subsystem "F" in the
time interval "'ZS".
The reliability "RS
Il of "Sft, that is,., the probabilitytha:'t "Sn is
not yet failed at time fit", is given by
ns C:) i (nS-i)RS = I: RS (l-RS ) (1)i=kS
whe:re
Hg = re11ability of a unit.
The probability "Fß " that ftSft 15 already failed at "t" 15
ns (ns \ i (ns-i)Fs = I-RS = . I: i'j Hg (l-HS )J.=m
S
where
(2)
(3)
If ftF ft 1s the failure cumulat1ve probability distribution of theF
functional subsystem "Ft!, we get
(4)
We have
and
RS = exp (-~t)
(5)
(6)
.;. 70 -
From eqs. 5 and 6 we obtaln
dFF ". ,{~ J Yr,
From eq. 1 W~ get
,~F,
Ss
dRs =
(. Ilg)! (8)
=
Taking into account eqs. 3 and 7, eq. 4 becomes
Taking into account eqs. 2 and 8, we get from eq. 9
(la)
Taking into account eq.6, eq.10 finally becomes
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n-m -1S S
+ (mS+l ) I .' t1;;t..:
1
(mg+l+j) !
Where 'Ttf stands for. the "r"-functionfl
If
Hg (1:S)
l-~ (ZS)
~ « 5 _10-2
1 s
(12)
eq. 11 can be simplified to
[. J(ms+1) - ] (n -m +1)~ (ZS) I-HSCOZS) S S
. - (13)
If we have
(J -2
..J s't's < 10
we can write
and
Taking into account eqs. 15 and 16, eq. 13 can be still simplified
(14)
(15)
(16)
(17)
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Let us suppose that we have t'Wo säfety subSystems Ilg1 ft and tlSglt. We
want tö caiculate the. p~6bability "ttlt that bbth fa.:l.i hefö~e the
functional subsystem "Fli in the time ihterval II'2"'SII.
The curnülative probäbllity distribution "F 81; S2 ",that both
$1 and S2 fall in a small time interval "t" is given by
(1)
The failure cumulative probability distribution !lFF of the functional
subsystem "F" is
(2)
The probability !la", that both "SI" and "S2" fail before "pli in the
small time interval "~", is m m
_ft='tS _ t..p (nS1 )!{nS2)!(SSl'lB) S1(-1's218) S2~
a - ~o PS1;S2 dFF- (~1+ns2Tl)(mSl)!(nSl-~1)!(~S2"nS2-mS2)!
Eq.} can be written as follows
(3)
where
and
(nSI )! (.S'Sl1i)mSlc
(mSl+l)!(nSl-mSl)!
(nS2 )! (~2t')mS2
(mS2+l)! (nS2-mS2 )!
(4)
(5)
(6)
H =31"S2
(mSl+1 )(mS2+1)
(mS1+mS2+1)
HS1 ;S2 - •• . ;3N
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BSl;s2 is called Coupling coefficient
For !IN" safety sUb§ystems we have
N
-rr (nsi+1 )
i=l (8 )
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120 Appendix 4 :Calculationof the average fa:llure rate of a,s,afety !Subsystem
Let us suppose that "('1e have a safetY$ubsystem "s" made of unS" units so connected
that~ if "Q.S'i out of the unS" urdt::s fail t-7ith the failure type "b"" the sub-
systetn flS"falls (false trip).
We introduce the follow1ng symbols
Os =average failure rate of a,unit defined by eq. 5 of para. 2
Ps =average repair rate of a quitt that 1s reciprocal of the mean
time to repair.
If gS(t) is the repair probability density distribution of a unit" we have
(I)
The safety subsystem can be at time fIel in one of the follov1i.ng states (figo 25).
Number of Number of
State vl0rking failed Comments
units units
0 ns
O·
1 n -1 1S
2 n -2 2S
"
. . . . . . .
i n -1 iS
. . 0 • . . .. .
Q. -2 ns-Zs+2
Q. -2
S S
1. -1 n -9, +1 Q. -1S S S S
Q,s ~ns-Q,s ~ Q,s Subsystem failed
Let us 1nd1c~te with Qi(t) the probabllity that the subsystem "s" 1s in state "iH •
He can write the follow1ng uQ.S+l" equaticms
(2)
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(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
Since
(7)
only Hf!.. " of the "Q, +1" equations are independent.S S
The associated initial conditions are
Q (0) = 1
o
and
Q. (0) = 0
'J.
(8)
(9)
Taking into account the initial conditions 8 and 9? the Laplace transforms of
the eqs. 2 to 6 are
* *
-1 = -(n 0 +8)Q + ~SQlS S 0
o = nsosQ: - [(ns-t)0s+~s+sJQ~
(10)
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
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uhere
s =complex variable of the Laplace domain
"*,1 indicates Laplace trans form
The Laplace transform of the reliability !IR ft of the subsystem "Sft is given byS
* 1 *R = - - Q
-s s x's
Taking into account eq. 14, eq. 15 becomes
Nmv tve have
vJhere
(I5)
(I6)
(I 7)
~ = determinant of the coefficients of the first "!/, nS
equations (eqo 14 excluded)
A1J1., =determinant complementary to the element ila i!S lf/,S(1st line and ".Q,eUth column) of the determinant t"
Cl
The determinant 1lt,,7f, having iI.Q,Sit lines and ft.Q,s" columns, 1s v;rritten below (eq. 18)
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~
U)
+
UJ
;:J.
+
tf.l
b
,.....
0 0 0 0 CI)
;:J. +
.u:l
~
I
CI)
l:l
'-'
l--J
I
r-1
U)
+CI)
;:J. CI)
+ bCI) ,.....
b N
0 0 0 CI) ~ +
;:J. N CI)
+ ~CI) I
~ i:r.l
I l:l
tf.l '-"
l:l
'-'
L...J
I
CI)
b
,.....
M
+0 0 0 CI) 0~
I
CI)
;:::
'-'
- 78 -
Taking into account eq. 17? eq. 16 becomes
Ort ehe other hand 1lJ:t*tt is alSo given by
S
JI, -]
S
I: Q~
1=0 ~
By solv1ng the system of eqs. 10 to 13? we get
Q* = (_I)i ~lii 6
(19)
(20)
(21)
(22)
where "6" is the determinant defined by eq. 18 and "Au
u 18 ehe determinant
complementary to the element IVa U n (l st line and IVi"th column) of 6.
Putting 21 in 20~ ue obtain
Q, -IS •
~E (-I) AU
1=1
By compar1ng eqs. 22 and 19? tJe get
s
JI, -I
S •
~E (-I) AU
i=1
(23)
By extracti.Ilg the determinant "AU 11 froIn 6 (eq. 18L one obtains
S
Putting 24 in 23 for s=o? one gets
The average failure rate flAS" of subsystem ilS" 18 given by
(24)
(25)
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Taking into account eqs. 22 and 25, we get
2S[il] 5=0 !/,S crs (ng) r
AS = Q, _ I = (-I) . ~Q,--~l------~ S i (nS-2S)!E (_I)i .[.Ali] k (-1) [Ali]i=1 s=o i=l 8=0
(27)
By extracUng the determinants "AU" from il (eq. 18)? l'le obta1n for s=o
~ J - - (fI,s-1) (i-I) ns(nS-l)(nS-2) ••• (ns-i+2) r.. _ , O's-i)AI! - ( 1) crs (n -fI, )! (nS I). crs +s=o S S
(Q, -i-l) (.Q. -i-I) (II. -i)]
+ (nS-i-l)lcrs S ~S + ••• +(ns-Q,s+l)!crs~s S +(ns-Q,s)!~s S
Taking into account eqs. 28, eq. 27 becomes
(28)
crs
Ag =-fI,-f-......f-p -st-·Q,,....~----i--l~_(-n-:--f'_'-~I--:i:-_f _)-!==-]
cr (ns-f)!i=o S f=o
Introducing the index
('J =n -f
L S
we get finally
(29)
(30)
(31)
As = iS-lrr~s)i nS (q-t-i)!].i~ ~as· q:"S-iS+l+i q!
Since in the practical case ~s/crs is very large? eq. 31 can be approxtmately
written as follows
(32)
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The calculatlon of "ASI! developed in this Appendi7 ~s strict1y rigorous only in
the case in which the f~~lure and the repair probability d1striputiods are both
exponenHaL However~ due to the cone1usion.s reached in Ap~endix 61 the result
1s stHl valid fot any type of distribution if 'taSfl and 1f1lslt are average values
deftned respectively by eq. 5 of para. 2 ahd eq. I bf this appendix.
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13. Appendix 5: Calculation of the point-availability for asimple plant model
The solution of eqs. (6), (7), (8) of rara. 3 will be obtained in this
appendix (see also fig. 7). We have three linear differential equations
with constant coefficients:
dQ
0
=
dt
dQl
......--...
dt
dQ2
=dt
(1)
(2)
Where Q probability that the plant is in state 11 Oll
0
Ql probabili ty that the plant is in state 111 11
Q2 = probability that the plant is in state "2"
~ = rate of occurrence of the event that the functional
system fails
KS = reduction factor of the safety system
K r... = rate cf occurrence of a lIdisasterIl i.e. of the eventS F
ihJ.t the functional system fails and the safety system
has already failed before
. ~S = rate of occurrence of a false trip
~ repair rate, i.e. reciprocal to the meantime to repair the
plant
For Qo' Ql' Q2 the following relation holds
1 (4)
Therefore only 2 of the 3 eqs. 1, 2, 3 are independent. The initial
- 82 -
conditions are
They mean that at time t == 0 the probability that the plant is in
state !lOIl is equal to 1.
Applying the Laplace transform to eqs. (1), (2) we get
*" '11:
-1 == - (s+7-p+f..S+KS f..F ) Qo + Y Ql (6)
o == ( "\V\ Q t1t
- s+ Tl '1 (7)
Where !lSll is the complex variable in the Laplace domain and the
asterisk 1I*!l denotes the Laplace transform.
We get with Cramer's rule from the system
-1 "0/
o - (s+~)
- (s+f.. +f.. +K f.. ).
F S S F
(6), (7)
I
for Q~
o
=
- j
- (s+'t')
s+\fI
s+ y
2 (8)
To antitrasform eq.8 to the time domain, the roots of the characteristic
equation must be found.
The two roots are
(9)
s = -1;2 2
+
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Fo!' t>rabtica~ cas~s, the rate of dccUrremce 01' a. b1g acetdeht tlk~}..it
~s veioy smali cornpa.r~d to the surn of the wo :failure-rates If\ft and
it >...s tI • They .areagain .. smallcompared to the repail- t'ate tt'ftt. The follow-
ing rel~tion therefore holdS:
(11)
Thls 1s d1scussed in more details in para. 3.
With 11 we get also the relation
4 (12)
Taking into account the expressions 11 and 12, we get from eq. 10
and
The antitrasform to the time domain of eq. 8 1s
(13)
(14)
Q. (t) =
o
exp (slt) + )' + S2S ·82 J. (15)
Tak1ng into account eqs. 13 and 14, eq. 15 becomes
Qo(t) ~{~!v't' + ~:~+'I' exp [t(Vl-s+o/1e";:::s~t)
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14. Appendix 6: Calcülatiqn qf' th~PQint~ava.ilabiJ,.ity!with ~ml typeqf' f'ailure,-
and,repait-probability-density-distribu"ti;hons
A.6.1 Introductiön,
The point-availability "A" of' the plant (arid likewise for a sub-
system or a unit) is defined as th.e.probability that the plänt
. , . \(anti likewise, the subsystem and the unit) 1s up at time "t":
A(t) = P tPlant is up at "t" t (1)
In the following treatment we shall suppose that all the failures
are repairable which, is equivalent to say that no "absorbing state"
exists.
A 6.2 Calculation 01' the Availability "A"
The availability "A(t)" is given by the following expression
where
1
1 (1)
1If·~ (5)"
l'f(t)"
1Iw *(s)"
"w (t)"
" s"
"L-1"
=
=
=
Laplace transform 01' f(t)
failure-probability-density-distribution
Laplace transform 01' w(t)
repair-probability-density-distribution
complex variable in the Laplace-domain
antitransl'ormation to the time domain
""'*",, indicates Laplace transformation
We introduce also the failure probability cumulative distribution
"F"(t) given by
F(t)
tJ f(t»)dt
o
(2)
Now we shall show how to obtain eq. 1. The availability A can be cal-
culated by summing the probabilities "P {E]! 01' all the mutually
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exclusive events HEnl! so defined
P {E 7n n.J
We get
A
= p f the plant has failed "nH tim:s
and been repaired "n" times S
(4)
We can write the fOllowing expressions for the various P {E
n
].
P (E 'l.1 0..) P {the plant has never failed unti.l t}
P fthe plant has failed at "tl", has
been repaired atHt 2" and has not
failed between "t2" and "tl! } =
t ....
= f f~-:F{t-t2)J w (t2-\)f(tl )d\dt2
o
t
= 1- Jf(t)dt
o
(5)
(6)
The Laplace transforms of eqs. 5 and 6 al'e
P* JE } *.I f (s)=l 0 s
and
L+ t*~slJ "* .*P*{EI ] - f (s) w (s)
e7}
(8)
By an iterated application of the convolution theorem for Laplace transforms,
we get for the Laplace-transform of p{E
n
} defined in (3)
p lr'{iJ ~ [ ~ -l1s)] {r~s)wls) Jn (9)
Substituting P *{E
n
1into eq. (4) we get
*A
n=f#
l:
n=o
(10)
Eq. 10 can be written as folIows:
.::.~
l-i'(s) (11)
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and finally antitransforming
*A(t) _ L'-l f'1. l-f (s~ ... ..1
- t~ l-f*(s w~(s) :r
A 6.3 Ca1cul~tion of the asymptotic availej.bility A .00
(12)
For t~~\tA(t)h approaches a limit ItA.tl which is largely used for many
practical cases. It is given by
lim A(t);: AM;:
t~at>
where
(1)
From eq. 1 para A 6.2 we get for t ~ oe
tlA oo"
" ~ "
tl 'r tl
lim A ==
t~QI;;
We have
asymptotic availability
average fai1ur~ rate
average repair rate
lim L-1 { I-f ~If
.. s(l-f*w *)t.:7oo
lim r1-f*J
s~o-
lim [l-f'w *J
s~o
(2)
*,lim f
8-7 0
and
1
" *1m w ;:
8~ 0
t
lim ~f(t)dt 1
t~_ 0
t
lim .r w(t)dt ;: 1
t~ 000 0
(4)
Eqs. 3 and 4 indicate that de l'HOpital's rule has to be used to eva1uate
the limit of eq. 2. We have
limA
t~40
(5)
- 87 -
We have
'*lim df /ds5+0
(6)
and
*"lim dw Ids =
t
- lim j'tw(t)dt =
t-;}...oo
1
'f
Putting 6 and 7 into 5, we get
Aoo = lim A
4e-
A 6.4 Calculation of the instantaneous failure rate 'Ixt"
(8)
.. dt =
We call instantaneous failure rate, "~",the quantity defined
P the plant is up at "t" and fails before "t+dt"
P the plant is up at "t" (1)
We shall calculate ":X;" as function of the failure-probability-density-
distribution, "f(t)", and of the repair-probability-density-distribution
"w(t)". The denominator of eq. 1 is the point availability"A" given by
eq.l of para. A 6.1.
We have to calculate the numerator of eq. 1, thatis the probability of
event "E" so defined
P (E} = P tthe plant is up at "t" and fails before "t+dt~ (2)
To do this, we sum all the probabilities "P {E
n
} of the following mutual-
ly exclusive events
P {the plant has failed n-times and has been
repaired n-times before "t" and fails again
before "t+dt"}
where n = 0, 1, 2,
With a procedure similar to that developed in para A 6.2, we can calculate
the probability of the event "E " defined by eq. 3
n
P tEn!=dt • L-1 ~-f'(S)~*(,S)ßr:if ! f'S)j} (4)
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where the asterisk t~ denotes the Laplace transforl'l1) and L-1 indicates
antitrasforl'l1ation tö the time domain.
We add all terms giyen by eq. 4 to ge~ P fE1
P(ll) ~ dtL-1[[i -~s9 i:;~-!'(S)W'1sD1 (5)
Finally we get
P{EJ: dt L"l(ii:~:l~(~f J
puttirig eq) 2 cf para A 1.1 (the availa.bili ty ItA.!.I)
tion l~ We get *
X = L-1 (1-~~f:1 w~d
... f -1 (1 1-f* s) )
L 5 I-f~(s Wjif(S)
A 6.5 Calcul/3,t1on of the instantaneous repair rate ,,~lt
(6)
ahd eq. 6 into equa-
We call instantaneous repair rate the quantity uX lt, so defined
. w
X . dt = lithe plant is down..!:t "t"_and is repaired b~forent+dttl}
w P {the plant is down at "tltJ .
(1)
We shall calculate "Xn as function of the failure-probability-density-
w
distribution, ltf(t)lt and -of the 1:'epair-probability-density-distribution
t1w(t)tt. The denominator of eq. 1 is equal to "I-A" (where "Alt is the
availability, given by eq. 1 of para. A 6.1).
The numerator of eq. 1 is the probability of the event ltE"
P { E] = P {the plant is down at "tU and is repaired
before 11 t+dtlt .1
p{E}Will be obtained by summation of all the probabilities
mutually exclusive events ttE lt defined as folIows:
n
(2)
of the
p{~he plant has failed n-times and has been repaired
(n-I) times before lttlt and is repaired again before
lt t+dt"} (3)
where n = 1,2, 3 .~ ... ~ ...
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With procedure similar 'Co that developed in para. A 6.2 and A 6.4, we get
{ 7 1 r * :lI' -,.,. ;t~ Jn}P En)= dt L- 1f (S )W(S) Lf (s)w (s)
We add all terms givenby eq. 4 and we get
Taking into account eq. 5 and eq. 1 of para. A 6.2, eq.l becomes
(4)
(5)
= (6)
A 6.6 Calculation of the asymtotic values of "X" and !IX 11
f w
,From eq. 8 of para A 6.4 we get
(1)
The limit at the denominator of eq. 1 has already been calculated in
para A 6.3. We have
lim
s~o
where
and
1
s
=
" =
=
1
lt1It>
ftw(t)dt
o
1
j"tf(t)d'C
o
(2)
(4)
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For the numerator we have to apply the rule of da4'HOpital. We have
lim '. jl'(sJ~oL
=
- lim
~
(5)
Ptitting eqs. 5 and 2 1nto eq. 1, we get finally
11m )(
t?oo f
= V (6)
With analogous procedure it is possible to verify that
11m X =y
t~ w
A 6.7 Conclusions
The conclusions, which we ean draw at the end of this appendix, are
very general and very important. If we have a plant (or asubsystem
or a unit) with failure and repair probability density distributions res-
pectively f(t) and w(t), the asymptotic values of the point availability
"Alt, of the failure rate II~" and of the repair rate lt XfJ" are the fol1ow-
ing
Where
11m A Aeo = 't'=
t~ 0IlI "r+V
11m X = V
t~oo f
lim X = ~.
t~.oo w
(1)
(2)
1
jcrw(t)dt
o
(4)
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and
1
d iI_.·.
]tf(t)dt
o
(5)
,
For the unavailability U we gEit from eq. 1
U = 1-A ~.. == V,
't'+y
This means that, for long perioqs of time (t -,>00 ), any system (plant-
or SubSystem or unit) behaves as. if it has a failure and repai'r proba-
bility density distributions both exponential with failure and repair
rates given respectively ty eqsO 4 and 5.
Th!S property of the asymptotic behaviour of the systems allows us
to extend many -~results obtaine~ with exponential distribut~ons to
cases where the distributions are not exponential.
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15. Appendix 7: Ca1culation of the average failure rate of a functiona1 subsystem
for different strategies
A 7.1 Functiona1 subsystem consisting of two units one 'tvorking and the other in
stand-by - No preventive maintenance
This case has been called "strategy 211 in para. 5.4. If l;re call vlith /lA" and
"B" the two units, the functiona1 subsystem Ilpll can be in one of the belo\?
1isted states
State "0"
State "In
Statte "2"
"A" in operation and 'jB" in stand-by or
"A" in stand-by and "Bn in operation
'VA" in operation and "B" in repair or
Itnil iri operation and HA" in repair
Both unit failed and subsystem therefore also failed.
The subsystem start t:1ith a unit HA" in operation and the other "B" in stand-by
(State ha"). If "A" fails? it is automatically sv;ritched off') while !IBn 1s auto-
matically stvitched into operation (State 1). The failed unH 'W' is repaired
and, when the repair is comp1eted? will be connected as stand-by unit (State 0).
The subsystem will fai1 if the working unit fafls before the repair of the other
is completed (State 2).
The reliability n~n of the subsystem "F" will be obtained by summing the follmving
probabilities "p." of the below listed mutually exc1usive events
~
P = P {A is not failed at IIt" }
o
(1)
PI = P {A 1s failed at " t 11 and B is not failed at "t"} (2)
_I
o < t- < t1
P2 = P {-BA is faUed at "tl n; A is repaired before B faUs ;""'t.
fails at Ilt2"; A is not failed at "tl! .J (3)
o < t) < t 2 < t
P1 = P fA is failed at "tl"; ,.A is repaired before ~ ~ai1S}
L." .. B faUs at Ilti ,,; A i8 not faUed at "t'i (4)
o < t 1 < t 2 ••••• < t i < t
--- -----~ -~----~~ ---- ------- ------~------~-~._~,.~._-_._---~._---------~----'----"-_.~-~~_._---_._----~,-_.-_.._ ------ - ------ --------~--- -
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We indicate with hF(t) and 8F(t) respectively the failure and repair probability
density distributions of each of the two units. The two cumulative distributions
Hill be
and
(5)
(6)
'Vle can write
Po = 1- j[t hFdt = 1 - Hp(t)
PI =~t hF(t l ) fJ- HF(t-t 1)]dt 1
o -
(7)
(8)
The Laplace transforms of eqs. 7, 8 and 9 are the following
*1 hp(s)
p* = - - ---
o s s
* (1 h;(S) \ *
P = - - ) h (s)1 s s. F
\.
p* =:; - r;)h*(h G)*
2 \8 s p PF
where
s = complex variable of the Laplace domain
"*" indicates Laplace trans form
(10)
(11)
(12)
*Looking at eqs. 10~ 11 and 12~ one can easily derive for Pi the following
expression
(
*\
* .1 hp \ * f J* i-IP. = - - - j h ,(h G_)~ s sJFI Fi'"I L (13)
The Laplace trans form of the reliability p~ can then be easily calculated
~=
00
L P'* =.!.
i:-::I 1 s
(14)
J~he average fai1tirc rate f1ÄFtI of subsystem nlim 1s given by
From eq. 14 we have
No'tV we have
11m h; = 1im lthFdt = I
s+o t-+<x> . 0
Tak1n.g into aeeount eq. 17, eq.16beeomßs
(15)
(6)
(17)
• '*I-nF
s
(18)
Applyit1g the theorem of <ler.!lIöpital, we get
* *I-hF dhF Jt = ....L11m --s- = - 1im --cir = 11m thFdt 0
S+O· S-I-O· t-+<x> 0 F
whare ltoFU 1.8 the average failure rate of 'aunit.
Taking it1to aeeount eqs. 18 and 19, eq. 15 beeomes final1y
Let us consider the parttcular ease in uhieh hp(t) i5 exponential
Taking tuto aceount eq. 21 5 we ean write
(19)
(2Q)
(21)
and
1im (hpGF)* = looap exp(-aFt)GF(t)dt =s~o ·0
= [exp(-aFt)GF(t)J~ + {<Xlexp(-aFt)gF(t)dt =
~o
= ~<XleXP(-aFt)gF(t}dt
Taking into aeeount eq. 23, eq. 20 beeomes in this partieular case
If gF(t) too i8 exponential
8F (t) = ].lp exp(-l1Ft )
l:-Je have
Taking into aeeount eq. 26, eq. 24 beeomes
°F11...... =-::---...,.--
1: 2 + 11.....,/0.....
l:! l'
Sinee l1F/op 1s usually very large, we get from eq. 27
a2F
(22)
(23)
(24)
(25)
(26)
(27)
(28)
It 1s very interesting to notiee that eq. 28 holds approx1mately also in the
ease in whieh gF(t) is not e~:ponential. In this ease u l117" 1s defined as average
repair rate
llF = (29)
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We have, developing exp(-aFt) in a Taylor series
If we stop the series at the first term~ we get from eq. 30
(31)
Putting 31 in eq. 24, '\,Je get
(32)
and, for ~F/aF very large,
(33)
A 7.2 Funetional subsystem eonsisting of two units, one working and the other
in stand-by. Preventive maintenanee.
This ease has been ealled strategy 3 in para. 5.4.
Eq. 24 of para. A 7.1 is approximately valid "tJhere i!or" is the average failure
rate defined by eq. 1 of para. 2.
Eq. 33 of para. A 7.1 ean also be used, ~7here "~FVI is the average repair rate
defined by eq. 29 of para. A 7.1.
A 7.3 Functional subsystem eonsisting of finF" units.~ ilkpl1 of these units are
working and the other nF-~ are in stand-by (Strategies 4 and 5 of para. 5.4)
If one of the working units fails, it is automatieally switehed off, while the
first of the itnF-kF
U stand-by units is at the same time automatieally s"tvitehed
into operation. The failed unit 1s repaired, and then eonneeted as last of the
stand-by units. If a seeond unit fails, the seeond of the stand-by units is
switehed into operation, and so on.
The subsystem fails if np-kp+l units are failed. The subsystem ean be at time
ue' in one of the belo"t.7 listed states (fig. 26).
----~~-~------_._---~ ~~~---- ---~-----------~ ~-----------------~
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Number of Number of Number of
State Vlorking stand-by failed Comments
! units units units
0 kF np-kp 0
1 kp rt -k -1 1F p
2 k np-kF....2 2p
• . . . .. . . . . •
i kp n -k -i iF F
. . . .
. . . . . .
n -k -} k~ 1 np-kp-lF F
.!
nF-kp k p 0 np-kF
nF-kp+l ~ 1· -1 0 ~n -k +1 Subsystem failed·~F F P
We shall suppose that the failure and repair probability density distributions
are both exponential
(1)
and
(2)
with GF and ~p both constant.
t'l e indicate with Q. (t) the probability that the subsystem "F" 1s in state "i".~
'\tJe can ~-:rrite the follm-:ring "np-kp+21i equations
(3)
(4)
(5)
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(6)
d~··-k+lF F
dt:'
Since
nF-kF+l
E Qi =
i=o
(7)
(8)
only "n -k +1" of the "n -k +2" equatiöns are independent.F F F F
The associated initial conditions are
and
(9)
(10)
Taking into account the initial cortditiöns 9 and 10~ the Laplace transforms of
eqs. 3 to 7 are
(11)
(12)
(13)
(14)
't'Jhere
- s (15)
s =complex variable of the Laplace domain
"*" indicates Laplace transform
- 99 -
The Laplace trans form of the reliability fiT') n;:1' of subsystem "FVl is given by
'* 1R- =--
-F s (16)
Takine into account eqe 15, eq. 16 becomes
~
- k-p0F o' 1
'* - np-~FP1' = ---'-'s~--:~';:"
NOvJ ,,1e ha'\7e
A .•
1; (nF-kp+J)
[j,
tvhere
(1)
(J8)
[j, = determinant of the coefficients of the first !luF-kF+l
ii equations
(eq. 15 excluded)
= determinant complementary to the element Ha il1;(np-kF+l) 9(l st Une and Hn -k +l llth column) of the determ~naIit "[j,tl.F F
The determinantA"having "np-kp+l" lines and nF"'~+1 eolumns, 1s 'fNritten belov1
(eq. 19).
-(kFoF+S) llF 0 . · . . 0 0 0
kFoF -(kFoF+llF+s) IIp • · 0 0 0
0 kFoP -(k-p°F+Jl,..+s) •••• 0 0 0...~. J~
0 0 kFoF · . . . . . .
t" = 19)
Taking into account eq. 18~ eq. 17 becomes
o
o
o
o
o
o o 0 0 0 CI o
IIp
-(~crF+"F+sl
'*P'p =
(j, - k~0"P A1.( -k +1)i! - , n r F
s[j, (20)
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*On the other hand IlR n is also given byS
n,!:,-k,.,.+1
'* ~ i! '*
Po =" 0
-'8 f., '--i
i=o
By solvirig the system of eqse 11 to 14~ we get
(2I)
(22)
(23)
'tlhere 11611 is the determinant defined by eq. 19 and IlAu
t
! is the determinant
complementary to the element "aU" (Ist line and ni"th column) of 6.
Putting 22 in 21, we obtain
np -kT,t+l
-,: i
E (-1) AU
* i=1RS =--"--------6
By comparing eqse 21 and 20~ 'tJe get
6 - kFoF Al~(n -k +1) np -kF+l
_____'......::1';,...'_F = i: (- I) i Al i
s i=l
(24)
By extracting the determinant A from 6 (eqe 19)~ one obtainsJ; (nF-kF+l)
(n -k +I)
= (-1) F l' (25)
Putting 25 in 24 for s=O~ one 3~ts
(26)
The average failure rate lI A VI of subsystem IIF" is given byF
l ' *~m R,;.
s+o -
Taking into account eqs. 23 and 26, we set
(27)
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By e~tra.cting the determ1nants HA I! from 6. (eq. 19) we obtain for 5=0li
[A 1 ·(_I)nF-kF+l-i (' ,(i-I) r..(k )nF-kF+J-i +l 1i _ s=o = l<p°F" L.'pop
np-k~-i (nF-kF-i) (n~-kF+l-i)]·
+ (kFoF) - ~F + ••• +(kpop)~F +~p -. . (29)
Taking into account eq. 29~ eq. 28 becomes
(28)
In the particular case kF=1 (only one unit working)~ eq. 30 becomes
CfF
Ap = -n-~-i-(-~-FF.-)(-:-n-p--~i':-)
i=1
(30)
(31)
(32)
Since ~F/op i5 usually very large, we can have the two following approximate
expressions derived from eqs. 30 and 31
n~-kF+l
(kpOF) -AT<' =< ----;---:--~-
- (nF-kp )
~F
(33)
For analogy with what we have found for the case of two units in para. A 7.1~
eqs. 32 and 33 should be valid also in the case in 't'Jhich "oF" is an average
failure distribution given by eq. 1 of para. 2 {with any type of failure distri-
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bution), and ~F 1sgiven by
gT;"(t)dt
..
(34)
with g~(t) being also not essentially exponential •
..
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16. Appendix 8: Calcu1ationo.f ,the e~'pected numb.et of non preventive replacements
(or retaeirs) c4rried out .~one rnain.tenance period of a unH
belonging tba,ftinctibnal subsystem.
tn this appendix ~'ie tva.nt to calculate the expected nurnber r:~ IV of non preventive
teplacements (or repaits) carried out in one maintenance period u0F" of a unit
belonging fd a functional subsystem (eq. 7 of para. 5.7).
Ne indicate with hF(t) thc failure probability density distribution of a unit.
t'Je indicate v7lth Pi (t) the probability that Ili 11 units have failed (and therefore
replaced) before time !leI and that the lIi+l 11 unit is ':'7orking.
Üe have
.--t
P = 1- J h ft)dto j?'
o •
.... t
Pt = )0 hF(t 1) [1-Hp(t-tt)]dt1
(l)
(2)
where
The Laplace transforms of eqso 1~ 2 and 3 are
(4)
*p
o s s
(5)
(6)
(7)
where If*" indicates Laplace transforIn) and "sn is the complex variable of the
Laplace domain.
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Looking at the eqs. 5 ~ 6 and 7 ~ t'1e can easily derive the follo~ling equation
ft h*(S)] _.. .pi = ls - Ps .. lh;<S>]1
MtitranSfenning eq. 8 to the time dömaitt t 'tve get
Pi - L~l f~;~S)Y ~ (I;<:)Ji+1 }
l #
where L-1 indicates antitransfonnation to the time domain.
The expected number ti~(t)1I of failed units at time "tH 1s given by
(8)
(9)
ce 00 {' } {-) i * 1 i * 1+1 -) . )x (t) = E i P. = E L - [hl;'(s}] - - [hl;'(s)] = L -F • 1.. S ,. s... S
1=0 1=0 '-
Eq. )0 can be tvritten as follows
(Il)
(10)
For t=6Ft we get flnally
"F = 1°\-1 (12)
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17. Appendix 9: Calculation of the expected nmber of non preventive replacements
(or repairs) carriedout in one ma1ntenance per10d of a unit
belonging to a safety subsystem.
We indicate with hS(t) and h~(t) the two failure probability density distri-
butions respectively for failure type ilaH and type "b".
The tt-10 modified failure probability distributions ~ t-1hich take 1nto account the
on-off-cycling due to the checks tvith checking periods "TS
n
, are respectively
(eqs. 3 and 4 of Appendix 2)
~ o' ) t(l+ :: ~+ 2 h tT S S
and (I +ög)h" r ö" Jt(t+ T:Jt s S
(1)
(2)
(3)
where "t" 18 still the real time and Os and ISS are two constants.
Taking into account eqs. 1 and 2, the total failure probabi11ty density distri-
bution h(t,TS) will be
h(t"S) = ~+ ::)hgt~+ :~)]t- [(I:~~~;f.] +
~ Oll) r~ ön~\l[ lt(l+O~/Ts)J
+\+ ': hSL\I+ ':JJC 0 hs(t)dt
Taking into account eq. 3, with procedure snnilar to that developed in Appendix 8,
we get the expected number lfXSlf of units failed in one maintenance period "OS"
(eq. 12 of para. 5.7)
(4)
t-1here
L-1 indicates antitransformation to the time domain
tt.u indicates Laplace transformation
"s" 1s the complex variable of the Laplace domain.
- 106 -
'"18. BihliogTaphy
A. B~oks
I
1. SyStem Engine~ring Handbook, ed. R.E.Machol
Hc Gratv-oollHill Book Company Ine. J965
(Ch. 33: R.D.Ross, Reliability)
2. P.L.fIeyer, Introductory Probability and Statistical Applications
Addison-Wesley, 1965
3. Statistieal Theory of Reliability (Advanced Seminar, Math. Res. Center,
University of'Wisconsin) ed. M.Zelen
4. E. Barlow, F. Proschan, L. Co Hunter
11athematical Theory of Reliability
J. Hiley and Sons, 1nc. Net'l1 York, 1965
5. I. Bazovsky
Reliability Theory and Practice
Prentice Hall Space Technology Series, 1965
6. So R. Calabro
Reliability principles and practices,
Mc Graw-Hill, 1962
7. D. K. Lloyd, M. Lipow
Reliability: Hanagement, ffethods and llathematics
Prentice Hall Space Technology Series, 1964
8. E. Pieruschka
Principles of Reliability
Prentice Eall, 1nc., 1963
9. G. Sandler
System Reliability Engineering
Prentice Hall Space Technology Series, 1963
10. Stanford University, Calif., Dept. of Industrial Engineering Reliability
Handbook, ed. TI. Grant Ireson,
Hc Gratv HilI Book Co. 1nc.) Ne't-J York, 1966
11. L. A. Zadek and Ch. A. Desoer)
Linear System Theory (The State Space Approach)
120 Ao G. Jo Macfarlane
Engineering Systems ftnalysis
G. G. Rarrap & Co. Ltd., London, 1964
(Deutsche übersetzung: Analyse Technischer Systeme, BibI. Institut,
Uannheim, 1967, Hochschultaschenbücher 31/81 a)
130 Yo v. Neumann
Probabilistic Logics and the Synthesis of reliable Organisms from unreliable
components, Automata Studies, Annals of Math. Studies no. 34, Princeton
University Press 1956
- 107 -
14. H. H. Pierce
Failtire-tol&tant Cbmputer~~esign,
Academie Press, Ne# York, i965
15. V. Heyh,
Elemente der Schaltungsalgebra
Ro Oldenbourg, München 1964
160 K. Eo Iverson
A Prograüming Language
John Hiley and Sons, Inc.~ Ne'tv York 1962
(eh. 7, Logical Calculus)
17. Po Lo Ivanescu
Pseudo-Boolean Programming and Applications (Lecture Notes in Mathematics)
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1965
18. G. Doetsch
Anleitung zum praktischen Gebrauch der Laplace-Transformation
R. Oldenbourg, München, 1961
19. H. Fel1er
Introduction to Probability Theory and its Applications
New York, Wiley 1950, 2. edo 1958
20. Bo W. Gnedenko
Lehrbuch der iJahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung (übersetzt aus dem Russischen)
Alcademie-Verlag, Berlin 1958
210 H. Loeve
Probability Theory
D. van Norstrand Compan, Ine., 1963
22. Do Morgenstern
Einführung in die Wahrscheinlichkeitsrechnung und Mathematische Statistik
Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1964
23 0 ';1. Uhlmann
Statistische Qualitätskontrolle
B. Go Teubner, Stuttgart, 1965
240 J. W. Pratt, Ho Raiffa, R. Schlaifer,
Introduction to statistical Decision-Theory
l1c Grat" HilI Book Company, New York, 1965
25. S. Vajda
An Introduction to Linear Programming and the Theoryof Games
Methuen & Co. Ltdo, London 1960
(Deutsche Übersetzung~ Einführung in die Linearplanung und die Theorie
der Spiele, R. Oldenbourg. München, 1961)
26. E. J 0 Gu..G.bel
Statistical Theory of Extreme Values and some Practical Applications
(A Series of Lectures)
National Bureau of Standards (NBS)
AppUed l1athematics Series, 33, 1954
- 108 -
27. D. R. Cox
Renew'al Theory
r-1ethuen & Co. ttd., Landort, 1962
(Deutsche ühersetzung~ Ernetierungstheorie t R. Oldenbourg Verlag, ~1ünchen
1966)
28. N. U. Prabhu
StochasticPfocesses
The Hacmiliah. Co., New York, 1965
29. t. Takacs
Stochastic Pro~e~ses
Hethuen & Cp. ttilt•.~ tondon~ J960
(Deutsche\üb~~setelihg: Stoehastische Prozesse~ R. Öldenböurg Verlag,
München, 196!)
B. Rep4rts ahd Publlcations
1. E. F. Moore, C. E. Shannon
Reliable Circuits using less reliable relays
J. Franklin Inst., VoL 262, part land 11, 1956
2. C. E. Shannon
A symbolic Analysis of Relay and Switching Circuits
Trans. AIEE, Vol. 57, J938, pp. 713-723
3. C. E. Shannon
The synthesis of two tetminal switching cirucits
Bell System Technical Journal, Vol. ..?8, No. 1, Jan. 1949, pp. 85-98
4. C. U. Griffin
Introducing the Fault-Tree as a Tool for Nuclear Safety Analysis
A~S-Transactions2, 157 (1966)
5. vJ. Schikarski
Überlegungen zu schweren Reaktorunfällen (Ansätze zu einer neuen
quantitativen Unfallphilosophie)
KFK-530, GfK, Karlsruhe, 1967
6. J. C. Moore,
Research Reactor Fault Analysis, Part I~ 11
Nucl. Eng. March, April 1966
7. R. J. Mulvihill, F. C. Reed
A probabilistic Methodology for the Safety Analysis of Power Reactors
AEC-Report No. SA1~.-570-2
8. P. Doseh, 11. Oehmann, E. Benz
Sicherheitsschaltungen für schnelle Reaktoren
(PSB-Bericht Nr. 13/64) GfKm.b.H., Karlsruhe, 1964
9. A. E. Green and A. J. Boume
Reliability Considerations for Automatie Protective Systems
Nucl. Eng., August 1965
- 109 -
10. L. Cave, R. E. Holmes
Suitability of the AGR for Urban sitinß
Atomic Power constructions Ltd.
11~ o. l{necht~ Interatom Bensberg
Correlation between Reactor siting änd Containment
(Ift~A-Symposium on the Containment snd siting of nucl~ar power plants»
Vienna~ 3-7 April~ 1967)
12. W. R. Wise, J. F. Proctor,
Explosion Containment laws for Nuclear Reactor Vessels,
NOLTR-63, US-NOL, (Final Report). f'Jhite Oak~ Haryland~ 1965
13. C. A. Willis, W. J. Carlson (AI),
Fault tree Analysis for SNAP-Reactor Disposal Systems,
A}lS-Transactions, vol. ~» no. 1 (1966) 159
14. Aerospace Safety-Program-Safe Disposal of SNAP Reactors
(AEC Research and Development Report),
AI, by R. L. Detterman, A. Heitzberg? C. A. UHUs
15. J. t'J. Croach
Quantitative Analysis of Hazards
(Subcommittee on Nuclear Space Safety Ad Hoc Committee on Nuclear Space
Program, Atomic Industrial Forum, Inc.) Dec. 8, 1964
16. E. G. Schlechtendahl et al.
"Safety Features of a 300 lilTe Sodium Cooled Fast Breeder Reactor"
Conference in Aix-en-Provence~ September 1967
17. Hilitary Specification, :lSystem Safety Engineering of Systems and Associated
Subsystems and Ef!uipment; General P..equirements Forll~ 1'1IL-S-38130A
18. A. B. l1earns
Bell Telephone Laboratories, Inc., "Fault Tree Analysis~ The Study of
Unlikely Events in Complex Systems"
19. David F. Haasl, System Safety Engineer, riissile Branch, Aero-Space Division~
The Boeing Company, Seattle, Washington~
"Advanced Concepts in Fault Tree Analysis"
20. Concepts of System Safety Ifathematics" Kazuo Konda~ System Safety Engineer,
The Boeing Company~ dated June 1965
21. Computer Evaluation of Fault Tree Hodel, John :H. l1ichels, Analog Applica-
tions Engineer, The Boeing Company, dated June 1965
22. Phyllis I1. Nagel, Applied l1athematics Research Engineer, Engineering
Analysis Missile Branch, Aero-Space Division, The Boeing Company,
"A 1ionte Carlo l1ethod to Compute Fault Tree Probabilities li
23. R. J. Feutz and T. A. Waldecks
uThe Application of Fault Tree Analysis to Dynamic Systems"
The Boeing Company~ dated June 1965
24. Fault Tree p~alysis as a Tool for System Safety Engineering,
J. B. Beller, Autonetics~ dated June 14~ 1965
- 110 -
25. Observations Relative to Fault Tree Analysis~ c. O.tttiler,
AerospaceSafety Division~ USC~ dated October I, 1965
i
26. Proceedings, System Safety Symposium, by Neil .E. ClaiSo~ arid W. R. Owens,
The Boeing Company, Seattle~ Wastiington~ dated Jun~ 1965
27. Preston T. Fa.risn, 'iLdunch Vehicle Safety Engi,t1.eering for Standard
Payload Hodule tf ~ NASA TI1 X-53282 (Revised October. 20, 1965)
28. Dr. Norman·R. Roberts and [ir. David Haasl~ Department of Mechanical
Engineering~ University of Hashington, Lecture Notes - Systems" Safety
Analysis~ SupplementaryNotes.- "Honte Carle Techniques"; "Eletnentary
Logie"? "~rqb~bility Theory"~t1Distribution.~ndEstimation t ; , "Boolean
Algebra and SHitching Circuits"~ "Elementary Concepts in Game Theoty
and Decision Theorylf.
29. G. E. tngrani
The Probabilistic Nature of Engineering and Experimental H~chätiics
(SP-338), July 1965, GE, Santa Barbara, Calif.
30. E. L. Helker
The System Effectiveness concept (66 niP-17), February 1966
GE, Santa Barbara~ Calif.
31. E. L. Welker
The Basic Concepts of Reliability Measurement and Prediction
(65 n1P-63), September 1965, GE, Santa Barbara, Calif.
32. E. L. \11elker
Predicting Reliability and Haintenance of Complex Systems by non-parametrie
methods (Ninth Symposium on Reliability and Quality Control, San Francisco,
Calif., January 1963)
33. E. L. Helker
Preventive Maintenance from the System viewpoint
(not published)
34. John A. Counor, Calculations of the risk of component application in electronic
systems, Trans. of IRE on Reliability and QualityControl (RQC), Januar 1957
35. Feyerherm, Prediction of tube failure rate variations, Trans. of IRE on RQC,
Januar 1957
36. Bille, Reliability indices for missile electronics component parts, Trans.
of IRE on RQC, Juni 1957
37. ~lunson, On the measurement of component reliability~ Trans. of IP"E on RQC,
August 1957
38. Youtcheff~ Statistical aspects of reliability in system development~
Trans. of IPE on RQC, November 1957
39. IRE Convention Record 1956jl Part 6. Hanufacturing Electronics~ The effects
of environmental and operating conditions on the reliability studies of
electronic equipments
- 111 -
40. Oetson, vJagener, Holmes, Child, Oxide eathodes in modem receiving valves,
Trans. of IRE, 1952, part IU, page 69
41. Sehoer, Reliability in eomplex eleetrbrlie e4u~pment, Electrlcal Engineering,
Deeember 1955
42. Harris, Tall, Predietionof eleetronies equipment reliability, Eledtrical
Engineering, November 1955
43. Kad, A new life quality measure for eleetron tubes, Trans. ~f IPE bn RQCj
April 1956
44. Märous A. Aehe$on, Eleetron tube,life a~d reliabilißy - Bu11t in dtibe
reliability, Trans. of tRE on RQt, Apri1 1956
45. Sanford A. Mol.tzer1 Des!ghifig for Reliability, Trans. of IFE on RQC,
September t956
46. D.llil!, D. Voegtlen and J. Yueh, Parts vs. systems: the reliability
dilemma, Trans. of IP~ on RQC, Februar 1956
47. R. G. Hiles, Statistical design - a means to better produets, Trans. of
IRE on RQC, April 1'955
48. E. G. Rowe, P. Welch , Developments in trusttvorthy valve teehniques, Trans.
of IRE on RQC, Decembe.r1954
49 .. H. E.Blant"On, R. :L1.J~s, A survey of teehniques for analysis and pre-
dietioIl of equipment re14..ability, IRE Trans. RQC-ll, no. 2, July 1962, pp. 18-35
50. R. $. Robins, On Hodels for Re1iability Predietion, IRE Trans. RQC-l1,
no. 1,Uay 1962 , pp. 33-43
51. F. 11. Gryna et a1. (editors), Reliabi1ity Training Text, Institute of Radio
Engineers, 1960
52. L. Hellermann, A Computer Applieation to Re1iab1e Design, IRE Trans. RQC-Il,
no. 1, Hay 1962
53. F. K. Bue1ow, Improvements in Current Switehing, IP~ Trans. EI. Computers,
vo1. EC-9, no. 4, Deeember 1960
54. R. H. Doyle et a1., Automatie Fai1ure Recovery in a Digital Data Proeessing
System, IBH Journal Res. Deve1opment, January 1959
55. siehe tinten
c. Journals and Periodicals
I. Proeeedings of the National Symposium on Reliability and Quality Control, IRE
2. Annals of Reliability and r1aintainability
(papers from the Annual Reliability and ]1aintainability Conferenee~
sponsored by the Ameriean Institute of Aeronautics, and Astronauties~
the Soeiety of Automotive Engineers~ and the Society of Mechanieal
Engineera, New York~ American Institute of Aeronauties and Astronautics).
55.Br. Vetter ~ VC:r.fr;Lb~rl:eitsuntersuebuno;enfnr GrundlastkraftTTcrke. "'itt.cl.Ver. der
Großkesselbesitzer C.\1~ "eft 96, Juni 1965, 5.135 .
D'r.Vctter, Dr.·Teuroth~. Dir,1.-~;nt·-11.Iu:1.utz" un·.n.·,ubl~~l.()_e·d·· "orl a d ri at i
J " ~, ...._. ,] ,(. n p v e commun ca-
tions, IiTfE r::gscn~ :\bt."!. (for ?ara 5 and 7)
- 1.12 -
3. IEEE-Transactio~sonReliability
(IEEE Reliability Group)~
Published aperiödically
4. Reliability Abstracts and Technicai Reviews (r~TR)
Pubtished mohthlyby US-Government 9 NASA, Reli~bility ähdQua1ity Assurance
Office, prepared by the Research Ttiangle institute, Durham) N~C.
5. Technische Zuverlässigkeit in Einzeldarstellungen
Herausgegeben von A. Etzrodt, Oldenbourg Verlag, München
- 113 ...
List of the ftghr~s
Fig. 1 Block diagram of the links between the functiotial ~nd säfet1 system in
in a plant.
Fig. 2 Schematic block diagram of the donnections between some safety subsystems.
Flg. J Fai1~te rates of ä tihit be10nging io a safety subsystem.
Fig. 4 The reduction coefficient ilKSn of a safety subsystem as funet16n eH! itii:..
product bet~veen the unit average failure rate IIp ,, 11 (fai1ure type "a ft )
;)
and the checking time interval "TS
n
• (Case m=l)
Fig. 5 The reduction coefficient "KS" of a safety subsystem as function of the
product between the unit average failure rate llp~' (Failure type "a") and
the checking time interval "T S
n
• (Case m=2)
Fig. 6 The reduction coefficient "K8" of a safety subsystem as function of the
product bet~'1een the unit average failure rate uPs" (Fai1ure type fla") and
the checking time interval "TS". (Case m=3)
Fig. 7 F10w diagram of plant states (Simple Nodel).
Fig. 8 Annua1 cost IIcF" of a pmtTer supp1y unH as function of the unit failure
rate HOp".
Fig. 9 The partial annua1 10ss nZ iI as function of the fai1ure rateF
the pO~1Ter supply unit.
Fig. 10 The maximum allovlab1e reduction coefficient "K "as function of the
max
fai1ure rate (tyne "bI!) "A ii of the safety subsystem.
- S
Pig. 11 F10N diagra~ of plant states.
Fig. 12 Schematic diagram of the blocks of a nuclear power plant.
- 114 -
Fig. 13 Schematic diagram of the primary coölänt cirtuit and of the primary
cOellant pump
Figo 14 Schematic diagram of the trees which link the initial events to the
shut dmm states
'F. 15 Tree 21_1.g.
Fig. 16 Tree 22
Fig. 17 Tree 23
Fig. 18 Tree 24
Pig. 19 Tree 25
Fig. 20 I:1inimal paths
Fig. 21 Disaster Tree
to the shut do~~ states belonging tel the block No. 2
Fig. 22 Hinimal paths to the Udisaster staten
Fig. 23 Schematic reactor container
Fig. 24 Stress and strength probability distributions
Fig. 25 Flow' diagram. of the states of a safety subsystem (failure type "bit)
Fig. 26 Flow diagram of the states of a functional subsystem
Pig. 27 Flow diagram. of plant states
Clctions ofthe safetysystem
I
I
Functional
System
Signals Safety
System
Block diagram of thelinksbetween thefunctiona[andsafety systeminaplant
Fig. 1
5·11
5·12
n = number ofthe units
m = number. cf th~ units which mllst fai! in
order to make thesubsystem to fai!
(fäilure type "a")
k == number oftheunits ~o1hich must function
inorderto make the subsystem to. functiön
)1, = number. ofthe unitswhich must fai! in
orderto make the subsystem tö fall
(fai!uretype "b")
514 I I 515
513
S11 = structure orthe channe1s measuring the vortage to themotor of the primary
coo lant pump-
S12 == structure of the channels measuring the primary coolant flow.
S13 == StrUCture of the channels measuring the reactor outletcoolant telnperature.
S 14 = intermediate relaysnetwork.
S15 = structure of reactorshut down äctuators.
·SCHEHAT.IC·. BLOCK DIAGRAN··OF THE CONNECTTONS.A.HONG .. SOHR SAE'ETY· SUBSYSTENS
Flg. 2
"(1."
5
or
"9;
e=ßs
e=d,5
9
5
= unit faiture rate (foilure type "a")
-
0'5= unit failure rate (fctiluretype"b" )
'tS.= time interval between two checks
es= time interval petween two. preverytivereplacements
(or repairs )
Failurerates 01a unit belonglng to asafety subsystem.
Fig.3
2510 4 2510 5 25
~~v
.~Vof thl <:-'" -...ns= to al number units ... ~<;',,":Jmber of ur its whic h must ~" ~ .,"-ms= nu " ...
fail in order to ma~ e the / "..... ".../
su"system tp fail /~V~' ·. ( f Hure typ "a ")
~VV
~~V/
./~V V
I~VV
~~V./
./~j//
~j/V
~/
V
- - - -
2
5
5
2
5
2
2
5
Fig. 4
The recll;lctioncoefficient ·K~ of a safety subsystem as functionof the
product between the unit average failure rate I'~' (failure type "a" )and
the checking time interval a "es". (Case ms=1 )
·Fig.5
Th~ .re(:juction coefficieht"Ks• ofasafety subsystem asfunction otthe
product .betweentheunit average failure rate. iigsil(foilure type·o Illand
the ch~ckingti.m~ interval.·t"$·.( Cose ms::: 2 )
...... .. . . .. . .. . ....Fig.6
The reductign coefficient"K;ofa.safety .. subsystemasfunction of the
productbetweEJntheunito.veragefailure fo.te iig;ffaUure type iiauland
the checking time ·interval ."'t;':. (Cqsel1\= 31
State "0" =NormalOpercltio n
State "1" = Shut Down
State .. 2" = 0 isctster
flbW dio.grelm 01plant steltes lSimpleModel)
Fig.7
I I I I I 111 ----+---j~H++++1
-tt-ti-tit-----+J--.~--------+--i-+--~-~-i-41t=--ll-+-
---+--+-+++++++---1----+1 I I111I I-+-H I 11.11--+--"-
CF r~!§~m~'1~ml~~ftl'~§~I~~!mm~~ijl!10 9[pM/yearj~I_ =f ~-l- [1, r ~.....
l°i~mm'~.It••••~.n.16 1--.5~ t===t=t~rtrrtttr~~:=tr:=-t+·~4++Ht==t=-t++++Ht--t-tHiittr~i'ittttlr-ttrrnT11
1'.
A nnual costs 'e/cf a:
power supply unit as
function of the unit
failure rate "cf'''
u+-H+++l+ I I I11I1I I I II+J-H
-_.-+--+-
lOi 1--_ I==+-'+--. i. 0 Ln i~ ailat le or 01 harke
7 1---- -- -
6 .. -_.. -'
5 f-- ..
4 "'
3 - l\.
-l-U-i
r--- ,- r-
-j . --r--r- T-r,
-----t- --r . ,-.__ T.t-
' .. - -er. , --+--+i··iITTI
10, .. -, :!:ir ,:'~C'-C'11 = -Tc ,. -T::;- . ,-+-rn--
!~ -'e".: l=f!:t,.:::::= - ~ .±t~~T I '" I I """ I I "5__ tl .,---- I I I I I 114t-- 1'> JII
3
--+--I--H-I-++I+- I I ma I I I I I I 11I I I I I I I I1I I I I I I I 11I I I I I I I I 11
-LW-I-H
++I.J U .J -+- :=t..l10'" ~- -LlU9 ,_~ ,,- ~~ ._- - . I ~4
3 I
............r--
10" -98 •
Z / ~
5 .
4
3 --f---
Fig. 8
I I I I I 111I I I I I I 11I I I· I I I 111I I ++ 1 I I 1II I I I 1I1II .--l_.... -i-n·l_
10 10-5 ~. 3 4 56 78910- It . 345678910-3 3 4 56189 10-2. 2 3 45678910 - 1 2 3 45678910 0 3 45678910 1 ()F [year-1J
'lt
-" 11-'
-tl+ i"I I I I I I 1II I I I I I I 111 I+-+f i I if
172
7
17
The partial annual lass It ZF"
as functian of the failure rate
"<:i/af the power
supply unit
./ Tl
I)1/
v
~
./
17
v
j 11 ...L.I-I-HJ11 ~/!1110~
I LlL 11 ,_ _6 _5r---
4
3
...LI IJ.~...L ...L I 1 ..u i====t,['" .dWI I I I I Illi "ni' L.b 1.1" " = 1
'0: r . I I I I 1I '1--, --r+1-H!
• 1111"" I1 1 I 111 I ,
5
411111113 r
lOt I I I 11 I 11II I I I I I I 11I I I I I I I III I I I I ! I 11I I I I I IIIII I I I I1I i !I10-1' 2 3 45678910-'1 2 3 4 5678910",:! 2 3 4 5 6789 10 -.2. 2 3 4 5 678910-1 2 3 45678910 ° 2 3 456789101
Fig. 9
a; [yea,. -1 J
KmClx
1°7~~;§~m§~~Eijm~_~_~:~~~-: ~~m~---~--=~;:=...~·f--.~- #OO~~E#mt~t-l- ··_-~-:~ft,-llTlf:f1t~trnH:D-:~ ',-------=:-- -..
"" .
4 "
3 l--++H+I---- 1 I I 1 11I 11 -+----I--+-~-
"\.I
r\
Maximum allowable
reduction coefficient
"Kmax " as function of
the failurerate AF
of the power suppnes:
sUbsystem
I"
~ L
I'i
I'
lO;SL
8
7
65 .
4 1
31--- 11
"
I I ~
.1 I I "i.
1
~ I .1I II-t
10-39 '
8
7 ~
6
54 ....
'I I ....... ~~ 1.1 _ 1
"t
10~4 1\ Km~x :l:n /A f
8
7
6
5
4
3 "- "-~
I"lr~~~~~~~mt~!II~~ml~!§!I~~·"'N.~..11 Fig.l0
5 l==+=+mRi+--+-mW~f-+H-+tttt---t-tttttttt--=t
: I~~
10.8, 1 1 I 1 I 1111 1 1 1 I 1 I 1 11 1 1 I I 1 ! 11' 1 I I , 1 I I1I 1 1 , I ! I , 11 ! I I I , I '11 '\
10-'7 2 3 45678910-6 2 3 456.789
10
"5 2 3 4 56789 10 "tt 2 3 45678910-.3 2 3 45678910 -2.. 2 3 45678910- 1 A F [yecr.S)
State"O .. = Normal Operation
States "1 .. to" N" = Shut Oown
State "0" = Oisaster
Flow diagramof plant states
1=." 1,1,"~ .
Condenser ·(7)
Turbine (5)Steom Generator· ( 3)·
j
Primary circuit( '4 )
, ---
Reactor
(1·)
Secondar~ .circuir(9) Wc1terPum~ J8 )
Schernaticdfagfamoftheblocks .. ofanuclearpowerplant
Fig.12
4r----------.,
I
•513 .
measunng channels
of coolant outlet ~,
512
measuring chann,
of coolant tlow
1
515
514
relays network for
reactor shut down
aetuators
of reactor shut down
IL_
1
522
relays network for
pump shut down
523
actuators
of pump shut down
'!l-~-----l'l IL.____ _ . __~-., ~ __ J--- -"l
an I or
: feedback
__ coolant
.~
I
I
I
I
IL __,power
supplies
subsystem
F23
r-------------\~:-~~~~~=~======::===~---~~~~===~~-~~~~~~-~==~~-------------l: r-"('--------------------------------l I I
I I I .I ,.: I 511 5 21I I I measuring channels measuring charlnels
I I I of of oil pressure
+ • • motor voltage
I
I
I
...
'5
l::!
'0".
I
IImeasuring channels
F 22 oil circuit subSYSlerttor oil pressure
F 21
oil pumps
subsystem
'0
e
i
u
--
!
-
~1c:==J1c:=y r-------------
--REACTOR()) ..-'lI '0e
e
'E
0
u
--
N'
coolant
Stream Generator (3)
~
-- coolant)
(
L.1J
~bearingS
/"///////11//
I~
I~
'tJl
//
oil circuit
rotor
[stator I
electric motor
'0t ? ~ ~ /
n---~--/ -- ---- -/~-~~-- -----~
~J tl """"'" Ci"''''' ""mp{2I
stator
oil circuit
oil-air -
heat exchangerL1.J
~
rn
to open air
--~
• A
FIG.13 Schematic diagram of the primary coolant circuit and of the primary coolant pump
Initial Events Shut "Down States
24IS21~
E22F~ .. ..... .. ... .~211.".· .•\\ ~I25
1f'211.Q< ..... ..• Tree21 - Bi]
~f22~~ M Tree22 ..~
f23ff ~~ ..i • ...... ....~ ~;>:::::::: .. Tren] .j":j;']
Sch~mdtic diagrqm oft.helreeswhich Hri<theinitial 'events tothe shutclown states
Fig. J'
II Tree21Shut. Down Stelte ···21·Oil pumps .. subsY$tem
failed
S 21
functions ···Initial Event F21
Oil pumps sub.sysf~1Tl
fails·
Fig.15
5 23
functions
522
functions
515
fUl')ctiöns
514
funttions
Oilcircuit .slJbsystem
faUs
Fig.. 16
S' 13, ~
functlons
$21 falls
type -0 "
Sl'·
functions
Initi0[., .Event F23
power supplies
,sub -systern
foils
Fig.18
S22fails
type"Q"
521
functiohs
521 fails
type"a~'
fnftJal .• Ev.ent
S22fails
··ty~ 101,"
'l'litialEvent
S 21faits
tpe"b"
'I' Tree 25
Fig.19
512
functions.
521 =
~bsystems S 21 S 22 S 23 511 S 12
Shut Down F21 F22 F23
States with MinimalF~ type type type type type type type type type type"0" IIb" "0" "b ll "0" "b" "0" "b" "0" "b"
...........
21 Oil pumps subsystem failed 211 +
22 Oil circuit subsystem failed 221 +
231 +
23 Power supplies subsystem failed 232 + +
233 + + +
241 + +
242 + +,
243 + +24 Primary coolant pump failed 244 + + +
245 + +
246 + +
247 + +
248 + + +
251 +
252 +
25 False Trips 253 +
254 + ...
255 + +
Legend
Subsystem F21 = on Pumps
F22 = Oil Circuit
F23 = Power Supplies
\'
0il Pressure
M~suring
Ctignnels"
522 = Pump Interme-
diate Relays
Network
5 23 = Pump Actuators
511 = Motor Voltage
Measuring
Channels
512 = Coolant Flow
Measuring
Channels
Minimal paths of the shut down states belonging to the block N.2 2
Fig. 20
DisQster
Reactor
meltdown
A
r-------1i1iiffffm~\ ~~~=r=1I
;t..nd
I~
,-------'l'---------'1 '--_-----..Ir L-----I f"L-tI\---r~
1-
/An~
'--_-----'(1'\'--_---'LJ
/0\
.--------,1 ''------0I
I
FIG.21
Initial event F21
Oilpumps
s ubsyst. tails
Initial event
F22
Oil circuit
su bsyst. tails
Initial even t
F23
Fbw. supplies
subsyst. fails
Initial el/ent S2~ Initial event S 23
fails fa ils
. " .. .type b type b
Fig.22
Minimal päths
fo ·the "disaster
·staten
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
S1.4
+
+
S21
+
"a"I"b"l "a"l"bn
sn
+
S12
+
+
+
SII
+
+ 'I J. I+\ t +\ I +
+
+
I 1 I
+ I. I +
dIü
dll
dJ2
d13
d14
dl
d2
d3
d4
d5
d6
d7
da
d9
2ylinderbefore. eXRlosion
Fig..~23.A
fylinder after .. ex~losion
Fig.23B
Fig.23 Schematte ·reaeto.f .. container
~s ~
1Jf -
ttt
I
I
ii s
. (j)··cps· =ep.r<n s)
a>·CPt:i.Cf.·. (9t' ~
Pro 1:>0 bi lity
oensity
Fig.24Stressand strengthprobability distributions
"".
( ns -ls+2) Os
( ns -ls+1l 6$
}J..s
FIG.25
FloW diqgraolofthe states of Q safetysubsystem
(fqilu re type k b')
\
\
I
I
/
I
floW .diagrorn>OfJhesf(Jfes .. qfdfLiocfional
·su·bsyslern
State 0 = Normal Operation
States 1 ton = Shut Down With possibility
to 90 to the disqster stole
~I . :1. -. .: ••States n+1 to N =Shut Down
State.D::Di$Clster
Fig.27 Flowdiagrarn.ofQlant.states
